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Abstract
The delegation of services from producers to retailers is frequently at the origin
of transaction costs, associated with the discretion in the way retailers do their job.
This is particularly the case when retailers and customers collude to exploit loop-
holes in the contracts between producers and customers. In this paper, we analyze
how insurance distribution channels may a¤ect such misbehaviors, when car repair-
ers are joining policyholders to defraud insurers. We focus attention on the Taiwan
automobile insurance market by using a database provided by the largest Taiwanese
automobile insurer. The theoretical underpinning of our analysis is provided by a
model of claims fraud with collusion and audit. Our econometric analysis conrms
that fraud occurs through the postponing of claims to the end of the policy year,
possibly by ling on single claim for several events. It highlights the role of car
dealer owned insurance agents in the collusive fraud mechanism.
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Picard acknowledges 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1 Introduction
Vertical relationships frequently involve the delegation of services from upstream rms
to downstream retailers. This may be at the origin of transaction costs, associated with
the discretion in the way retailers do their job. Such transaction costs sometimes go
through the collusion between retailers and customers who exploit loopholes in the con-
tracts between producers and customers. Discount fraud and warranty fraud are instances
of such customer misbehaviors that involve collusion with retailers or frontline employees.
Discount fraud exploits the special discounts that companies may o¤er under particular
circumstances, for instance when discounted products are used for a specic purpose, e.g.,
educational use for softwares. Warranty fraud occurs especially when a service provider,
e.g., a car repairer, replaces a defective part with a new spare part and triggers the pro-
ducers warranty, although the defective part was not original and thus was not protected
by the warranty.1
This paper investigates another form of customer misbehavior facilitated by service
providers acting on behalf of distributors: insurance fraud. Our empirical focus is on
the Taiwan automobile insurance market and on the role of car dealer-owned insurance
agents (DOAs) in this market. DOAs sell not only cars, but also automobile insurance
to their clients, and furthermore they own an auto repair shop. Understandably, the
multi-faceted activity of DOAs and their long-term connection with car owners favor the
creation of a mutually advantageous policyholder-DOA alliance. Concerning fraud itself,
we will focus attention on the behavior that consists in postponing claims to the last
month of the policy year and in merging two losses in a unique claim. Deductibles and
the bonus-malus mechanism are the underlying reasons of such behavior.
1See Harris and Daunt (2013) on managerial strategies under the risk of customer misbehavior. Murthy
and Djamaludin (2002) survey the literature on new product warranty. Insu¢ cient maintenance e¤ort
by buyers and inadequate behavior of retailers are at the origin of a double moral hazard problem in
warranty management.
2
An insurance market model yields the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis. The
model focuses on the strategic interaction between, on one side, policyholders who le
fraudulent claims by colluding with car repairers, and, on the other side, insurers who
audit claims. Auditing claims is all the more costly when collusion between policyhold-
ers and car repairers is more di¢ cult to detect, which is particularly the case when car
repairers are sheltered by DOAs. In addition, should irregularities be detected by the
insurer, the high bargaining power of DOAs may allow them to deter insurers from en-
forcing penalties. The outcome is a higher fraud rate when insurance is distributed by
DOAs than through other channels. This is reinforced in the case of deductible contracts,
because deductibles weaken the insurersincentives to monitor claims.
Our empirical analysis builds on a database obtained from the largest insurance com-
pany in Taiwan. This data includes all of the policyholders who have led an automobile
claim in 2010, amounting to nearly 11,000 les. Our results sustain the prediction that
fraud is greater when insurance policies have been sold through DOAs than through other
distribution channels, and also that deductibles stimulate fraud.2 We also show that the
causal mechanisms at the origin of fraud (i.e., postponing claims, and possibly ling one
claim for several accidents) are linked with the bonus-malus system in force in Taiwan
and with incentives that are inherent in the design of deductible contracts. This will go
through an approach which consists of providing indirect evidence of such misbehaviors
and of its mechanisms.3 More explicitly, we show that the intertemporal pattern of claims
2Other authors have emphasized the e¤ect of deductibles on insurance fraud. Using data from Québec,
Dionne and Gagné (2001) show that the amount of the deductible is a signicant determinant of the
reported loss when no other vehicle is involved in the accident which led to the claim, and thus when
the presence of witnesses is less likely. Miyazaki (2009) highlights through an experimental study that
higher deductibles result in a weaker perception that claim padding is an unethical behavior, and thus in
a larger propensity toward fraud.
3Although Dionne et al. (2009a) is an exception, it is usually very di¢ cult to use direct information
on fraudulent claim to analyze insurance fraud, either because identied fraud is just the top of the
iceberg, or because of insurersreluctance to share condential information on the fraud they are victims
of. The preferred approach consists of establishing indirect evidence of fraud. For instance, Dionne and
Gagné (2002) and Dionne and Wang (2013) deduce the existence of fraud in automobile theft insurance
from the time pattern of claims among the twelve policy months. Pao et al. (2014) provide evidence of
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is consistent with policyholders fraudulent behavior favored by DOAs, after controlling
for other explanations, including adverse selection, moral hazard and the money recouping
behavior highlighted by Li et al. (2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides further motivation for our analy-
sis. We introduce some factual observations that should convince the reader that there
is a signicant degree of claim manipulation in the Taiwanese car insurance market, and
we describe regular fraud patterns. Section 3 presents a model of insurance fraud that
shows how these insurance fraud patterns are linked with specic features of insurance
contracts, particularly deductibles, and how fraud may be facilitated by the distribution
channel. Section 4 describes the data more explicitly. Section 5 presents our econometric
approach and discusses our results. Section 6 concludes. The paper is completed by an
appendix available online. It contains an extended version of the insurance fraud model
presented in Section 3 and complementary developments of our empirical analysis.
2 Motivation
DOAs hold a substantial market share in the Taiwan automobile insurance market. For
the insurance company that provides the base of our empirical analysis, 50.78% of vehi-
cle damage insurance is sold through DOAs.4 Furthermore, DOAs own the list of their
customers, which increases their bargaining power when they negotiate contractual deals
with insurance companies or when insurers monitor claims. An insurer who discovers a
claim manipulation by a DOA may indeed hesitate to take retaliatory actions because
of this strategic advantage of DOAs, who can choose to switch to another insurer.5 In
opportunistic theft insurance fraud by analysing the claim pattern in areas hit by a typhoon.
4More precisely, 67.52% of type A contracts, 84,19% of type B contracts, and 43.71% of type C
contracts are sold by DOAs. Read further for additional information on the three types of insurance
contracts in Taiwan.
5On average, DOAs sell more policies than other agents (three times more on average and considerably
more for the largest DOAs), and their market power is particularly signicant for deductible contracts.
They are independent agents, and, as emphasized by Mayers and Smith (1981), this status gives them
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addition, DOAs also act as car repairers, and this position provides them with an infor-
mational advantage: establishing that a claim has been falsied is particularly di¢ cult
and costly when it has been led through a DOA.
Our study is also related to the specic forms of automobile insurance fraud in Taiwan.
Li et al. (2013) have observed that a large proportion of automobile insurance claims are
led during the last months of the policy year. This is conrmed by our own database.
Figure 1 presents the percentage distribution of claims and the average cost of claims (in
hundred US dollars) over the twelve policy months. The heavy concentration of claims
in the last months of the policy year is striking. Policy years and calendar years do
not coincide and, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, the concentration of claims during the
last months of the policy year is compatible with seasonal uctuations in the number
of claims over the calendar year, with peaks during vacation months (January, June,
July and December). In addition, the average claim amount slightly decreases in the
nal policy months. Li et al. (2013) interpret this phenomena as a "premium recouping
e¤ect": some policyholders without accident during the previous months tend to le false
smaller claims during the last month of the policy year to express their feeling that they
have been unfairly treated by the insurance company.
(Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 here)
There are three di¤erent types of automobile physical damage insurance contracts in
Taiwan: types A, B and C. Type A and B contracts cover all kinds of collision and non-
collision losses, with more exclusions for B than for A,6 while type-C contracts only cover
more discretion in claim administration (e.g., they may intercede on behalf of their customers at the
claim settlement stage) because they can credibly threaten to switch their business from one insurer to
another. Actually, DOAs provide comparatively less stable customers to insurers than other insurance
agents, with continuation rates (i.e., the fraction of customers who keep purchasing insurance from the
same insurer one year after the other) which are about sixty percent for DOAs and seventy to eighty
percent for other insurance agents.
6Type B contracts cover all the areas of type-A contracts, except the non-collision losses caused by
intentional damage, vandalism, and any unidentied reasons.
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the damages incurred in a collision involving two or more vehicles. Contracts also di¤er in
terms of indemnity: Type A contracts o¤er low coverage with a deductible, type B con-
tracts may be purchased with or without deductible, and nally type C contracts provide
full coverage without deductible. Claims are per accident, with a specic deductible for
each claim. The change in premium is ruled by a bonus-malus system when policyholders
renew their contracts with the same insurance company, with a no-claim discount and
an increase in premium proportional to the number of claims, without reference to their
severity. The policyholders who switch to another insurance company bargain with this
company about the new starting point of the bonus-malus record
In this setting, opportunist policyholders may take advantage of manipulating claims
for several reasons. According to the premium recouping interpretation of Li et al. (2013),
defrauders are more likely to be among the policyholders who do not plan to keep a long
term relationship with the same insurance company if, on average, such policyholders feel
a lower moral cost of defrauding.7 In our empirical analysis, this will lead us to dene a
"recoup group" RG that includes the policyholders who have not renewed their contract
more than one year after the policy year under consideration.8
The bonus-malus system and the per-claim deductibles also provide incentives to de-
fraud. Firstly, the claims led during the last month of policy year t are not registered
in the bonus-malus record of year t + 1 (they will be taken into account in the premium
paid in year t+ 2), and consequently, the policyholders who plan to renew their contract
with the same insurer may be incited to postpone their claim to the last policy month, in
order to delay the increase in premium.9 Secondly, since the bonus-malus record depends
7It is well known that insurance fraud is often associated with the feeling that the insurance company is
unfair; see Fukukawa et al. (2007), Miyazaki (2009) and Tennyson (1997, 2002). The premium recouping
phenomenon could reect a kind of resentment against insurers, particularly from policyholders who have
not led any claim during the policy year.
8Because of the bonus-malus system (see below), the policyholders who renew their contract only one
year have the same incentive to defraud as the policyholders who switch insurers at the end of the policy
year.
9In addition, the bonus-malus system forgives the rst accident for drivers who have had no other
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on the number of claims and not on their severity, policyholders may be prompted to le
one unique claim for two accidents, should a second accident occur. This is even more
protable in the case of deductible contracts, since deductibles are per-claim: the strategy
that consists of postponing the rst claim and merging any other accident with the rst
one within a unique claim yields full coverage for the part of the year that follows the
rst accident. Type A and B contracts are subject to this kind of claims manipulation,
because they include coverage for losses other than those associated with the collision
between two cars. There is no third-party involved in such claims and no police report.
On the contrary, the claims led for type C contracts correspond only to collisions, and
they have to include a police report, which makes manipulation very unlikely. In our em-
pirical analysis, the set of policyholders who renew type A or B contracts with the same
insurer will be called the "suspicious group" SG because of this incentive to manipulate
the bonus-malus system, with subgroups SG1 and SG2 for no-deductible and deductible
contracts, respectively.
If we conjecture that some claims led in the last policy month correspond in fact to
postponed claims with the cumulated losses of two events, then we should expect that the
ratio of "the average cost of rst claims" over "the average cost of all claims" (hereafter
called the rst claim cost ratio) should increase during this month. Note however that
this prediction could also be interpreted as the outcome of a moral hazard mechanism:
this would be the case if a rst accident made drivers more cautious, and thus they have
less severe accidents should a second accident occur during the same policy year. To
disentangle these two explanations, we may consider type C contracts as a benchmark to
isolate the moral hazard e¤ect, since claims manipulation is unlikely for such a contract.10
Figure 4 conrms our intuition: the rst claim cost ratios for SG1 and SG2 signicantly
accidents for three years, which provides an even larger manipulation gain.
10Type C contracts only cover the risk of collision. Thus, their claims involve a third party, which
makes manipulation di¢ cult.
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jump in the last month, and this is not the case for type C policies.
(Insert Figure 4 here)
At this stage, we may come back to the part played by DOAs. Figure 5 conrms that
DOAs may favor the manipulation of claims. While the claims led by the policyholders
of the two suspicious groups, SG1 and SG2, are signicantly concentrated in the last
policy month, this pattern is even more obvious for the policyholders of each subgroup
that have purchased insurance from DOAs. Figure 5 also shows that the last policy month
pattern is much less obvious in the benchmark group, which includes those policyholders
who are covered by no-deductible contracts and who have not renewed their contract with
the same insurance company at the end of the policy year.
(Insert Figure 5 here)
3 The model
The core of the following model is the strategic interaction between policyholders who
defraud by colluding with car repairers, and insurers who allocate resources to monitor
claims. The objective of this model is to highlight the logical link between, on one side,
the intensity of fraud and, on the other side, relevant features of insurance contracts,
particularly the size of deductibles and the distribution channel.11
Consider a population of risk-averse drivers, whose type is dened by the couple (i; h) 2
fD;Ag  f1; 2g. Index i refers to the individualspreference for a specic distribution
channel through which they purchase insurance: DOA when i = D or standard insurance
11The model features the non-cooperative interaction between policyholders and insurers, in a costly
state verication setting as in Picard (1996). For the sake of brevity, several aspects of the insurance
market analysis are deliberately overlooked here. This concerns particularly the way individuals choose
their contract and their insurance distribution channel, depending on their risk aversion and on their
intinsic preference for a specic channel. A more complete version of the model is in Section 1 of the
Appendix (available online).
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agents when i = A. Index h reects the individuals degree of absolute risk aversion: h = 1
corresponds to a higher absolute risk aversion than h = 2. Drivers may have either 0,1 or
2 accidents during the same policy year, with probability 1 and 2 for 1 and 2 accidents,
respectively, and 1+2 < 1. These probabilities are independent from the policyholders
type. Insurance contracts include a deductible per accident. We respectively denote dih
and Pih the deductible and the premium of the contract chosen by type h individuals
who purchase insurance through channel i. Less risk averse individuals choose a larger
deductible, and thus we have di2 > di1  0.
Each accident may be severe or minor, with probability qs or qm = 1  qs, respectively
(independently from the policyholders type) and the corresponding claims are small or
large, respectively. To simplify matters, its is assumed that a large claim exactly doubles a
small claim. Fraud is committed by policyholders who postpone small claims till their last
policy month. They will le one single large claim for two minor accidents presented as a
severe accident, should another minor accident occur later during the same policy year.
Otherwise, their claim will be denied. Fraud reduces the retained cost of the acccidents by
half since the deductible is paid only once. It also provides a supplementary gain through
the manipulation of the bonus-malus system if the policyholder intents to stay with the
same insurer at least during the next year.
Defrauding requires colluding with a car repairer, and, in the case of successful fraud,
the policyholder and the repairer will share these benets according to their respective
bargaining powers. The audit of claims by the insurer makes fraud risky: each member
of a policyholder-repairer coalition that is spotted defrauding has to pay a penalty (con-
sidered, for simplicity, as a ne to the government), and the claim is fully denied (i.e., the
policyholder does not receive any indemnity).
Let us denote by ih and ih the fraud and audit mixed strategy of the policyholder
and of the insurer, respectively, for a population of type (i; h) individuals. ih is the
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probability that a type (i; h) policyholder postpones a rst claim (when the corresponding
minor accident occurs before the last policy month), with the intention to le a unique
large claim for two accidents, should another minor accident occur before the end of
the policy year. Fraud is concentrated among the policyholders who are willing to stay
with the same insurer, because they are the ones who benet most from fraud through
the bonus-malus mechanism.12 ih is the probability that a large claim (led by a type
(i; h) policyholder) is audited by the insurer.13 Such large claims correspond either to
true severe accidents or to two minor accidents that have been fraudulently aggregated).
We assume that audit allows the insurer to detect with certainty whether the claim is
fraudulent or not, i.e., whether it corresponds to two small claims that have been falsied
as a single large claim, or whether it corresponds to a true large loss.
The expected cost of claims per type (i; h) policyholder is written as
Cih = L  (1 + 22)dih + FCih + ACih; (1)
where L is the expected costs of accidents (depending on the cost and probability of
minor and severe accidents), (1 + 22)dih is the cost retained by the policyholder (in
the absence of fraud), FCih is the cost of fraudulent claims and ACih is the audit cost.
FCih is proportional to ih, but, for given ih, it decreases linearly with ih, because
auditing a larger fraction of large claims reduces average indemnity payment after detect-
ing falsied claims, i.e., claims that result from the merging of two small claims. DOAs
have some bargaining power with insurers and they may intercede with the insurer when
12The other policyholders will not have enough incentives to defraud.
13Note that the degree of risk aversion is not directly observed by the insurer. However, individuals
choose di¤erent contracts (i.e., di¤erent deductibles) depending on their risk aversion, and thus insurers
can condition their audit probability on the level of the deductible, and thus indirectly on the policy-
holders type. Note also, that the policy year and the calendar year do not coincide. The beginning of the
calendar year is evenly distributed over the calendar year among the policyholders. Only the rst claims
that correspond to (true or falsied) severe accidents are audited. For practical reasons, it is assumed
that insurers audit all these claims with the same probability, whether they are led within or outside
the last month of the policy year.
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a claim is denied for fraud. This intervention is successful with some probability, and
then it decreases the nancial benet drawn by the insurer from spotting a defrauding
policyholder-car repairer coalition. Thus, we may write
FCih = ih[a1(dih)  a2(dih;  i)ih]; (2)
with a1(dih); a2(dih;  i) > 0, where  i is a parameter that measures the bargaining power
of distribution channel i, with D > A.
14 We have a01 > 0 and a
0
2d < 0 because the larger
the deductible, the larger the nancial impact of claims falsication and the smaller the
gain to the insurer when a claim is denied after audit. We also have a02 < 0 because the
distribution channels bargaining power leads to a smaller insurers expected benet when
fraud is detected.
DOAs own and control their repair shop. Thus, it is assumed that auditing a claim (i.e.,
spending resources to discover whether a claim has been falsied or not) is more costly
when insurance has been purchased through a DOA than through a standard insurance
agent, because the protection of the DOA makes the detection of collusion more di¢ cult.
Let ci be the audit cost when the insurance distribution channel is i = D or A, with
cD > cA. The number of large claim led by type (i; h) policyholders is linearly increasing
with ih, which allows us to write15
ACih = ciih(a3 + a4ih): (3)
14Fraud, as it is described, may be committed by policyholders who intend to renew their insurance
policy and who have two small accidents, the rst one being severe and occurring before the last month
of the policy month. Thus, a1(dh) and a2i(dh) depend on the probability that a type (i; h) individual is
in this situation and it depends upon 1; 2 and qs. See Section 1 of the Appendix for a more explicit
formulation.
15a3 and a4 depend upon 1; 2 and qs. See Section 1 of the Appendix for details.
11
The insurer chooses ih in [0; 1] in order to minimize Cih, which gives
ih
8>>>><>>>>:
= 0 if ih < (dih;  i; ci);
2 [0; 1] if ih = (dih;  i; ci);
= 1 if ih > (dih;  i; ci);
(4)
where
(d; ; c)  ca3
a2(d; )  ca4 : (5)
with 0d > 0; 
0
 > 0 and 
0
c > 0. Let us assume for simplicity that 
(d; ; c) < 1 for
the relevant values of d; ; c. This means that systematic fraud would trigger the auditing
of all the large claims. Depending on the bribe that they have to pay to car repairers
for them to collude (which is not explicitly dened here), policyholders are willing to
defraud if the probability of being caught is larger than a threshold h(Pih; dih) 2 (0; 1).
Individuals always defraud when the audit probability is zero, and they never defraud if
all large claims are audited: hence the audit probability h(Pih; dih) for which they are
indi¤erent between fraud and honesty is between 0 and 1. This audit probability threshold
is type dependent (hence the subscript h in the h function) because it is a¤ected by the
intrinsic risk aversion of the policyholder, but it also depends on Pih because an increase
in premium may a¤ect the policyholders risk aversion through a wealth e¤ect,16 and it
is increasing with dih because an increase in the deductible makes fraud more attractive.
16For instance, under DARA, an increase in the insurance premium makes the policyholder more risk
averse, and thus less prone to conclude a risky fraudulent arrangement with a car repairer. In that case,
the larger the insurance premium, the lower the audit probability threshold above which fraud is detered.
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Thus, we have
ih
8>>>><>>>>:
= 0 if ih > 

h(Pih; dih);
2 [0; 1] if ih = h(Pih; dih);
= 1 if ih < 

h(Pih; dih):
(6)
A type (i; h) policyholder who has a minor accident before the last policy month and
her insurer play a non-cooperative game, with strategies ih and ih respectively. Its
Nash equilibrium is easily characterized. If ih = 0, then (4) gives ih = 0, which implies
ih = 1 from (6), hence a contradiction. Similarly, if ih = 1, then (4) gives ih = 1,
which implies ih = 0 from (6), hence again a contradiction. Thus, ih 2 (0; 1) and (4),(6)
give ih = 

h(Pih; dih) 2 (0; 1) and ih = (dih;  i; ci).
Thus, at equilibrium, the audit probability ih = 

h(Pih; dih) makes the policyholder
indi¤erent between fraud and honesty, and the fraud probability ih = (dih;  i; ci)makes
the insurer indi¤erent between auditing and not-auditing.
This leads us to simple predictions about the e¤ect of the type of contract and distri-
bution channel on insurance fraud. Firstly, using 0d > 0 shows that higher deductibles
go along with more fraud. Since d2 > d1  0, we have i2 > i1: in other words, for a
given distribution channel, fraud is more prevalent among type 2 than type 1 individuals.
More simply, if d1 = 0, we can say in a shortcut that deductibles encourage fraud. We
also have cD > cA and D > A, and thus using 
0
 > 0 and 
0
c > 0 yields Dh > Ah.
Put briey, for a given type of individuals, there is more fraud when insurance has been
purchased through the DOA agents than through standard insurance agents, because of
the ability of DOAs to shelter their car repairers either from full-edged inquiries or from
sanctions.
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4 The data
Our data comes from the largest insurance company in Taiwan, with an automobile
insurance market share of over 20%. Data is recorded at the individual level and provides
detailed information about the policyholders, their insurance contracts and the claims
they have led. Available variables are listed in Table 1. Data has been collected over the
2010-2012 period, but our analysis will be restricted to 2010, so that we know whether
policyholders subsequently renewed their contracts for less or more than one year.17 We
target the owners of private usage small sedans and small trucks with type A, B or C
insurance contracts for automobile physical damages. There are 109; 461 policyholders,
and 45:86% of them led at least one claim in the year 2010, which corresponds to
50; 194 observations. This subset denes our "research sample" (i.e., the sub-sample of
policyholders with claims).
(Insert Tables 1, 2-1 and 2-2 here)
The mean values of the variables in the two samples are displayed in Table 2-1, with
some signicant di¤erences. In particular, the research sample includes a larger proportion
of female, middle-aged owners, large-sized and new vehicles. The insured in the research
sample also tend to purchase higher coverage contracts than those in the whole sample.
Both the percentages of type A and B contracts are comparatively higher in the research
sample (1:52% vs 1:03%, 67:42% vs 38:82%). The vehicles are also more concentrated in
some particular brand. More importantly, the research sample includes a larger fraction of
policyholders who belong to the SG1 and SG2 group, and who have purchased insurance
through the DOA channel than the whole sample ( 15:17% vs 11:77%, 28:15% vs 14:48%,
and 62:16% vs 50:78%, respectively). The share of the RG group also increases from
19:8% in the whole sample to 28:47% in the research sample. Furthermore, the claim
17In what follows, years are policy years: a contract corresponds to year 2010 if it started in 2010.
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record measured either by the average bonus-malus coe¢ cient or by the average premium
is worse in the research sample than in the whole sample.
Table 2-2 separates the research sample into two subgroups, according to the insurance
distribution channels (DOA and non-DOA), with signicant di¤erences in terms of gender,
usage, and vehicle size. There is also a higher proportion of new vehicles for the DOA
channel, which reects the fact that DOAs sell both vehicles and insurance contracts.
On average, the bonus-malus coe¢ cient is signicantly higher in the DOA group than in
the non-DOA group, but insurance premiums do not signicantly di¤er between the two
groups.18 Furthermore, the percentage of insured parties who belong to the SG group is
signicantly di¤erent between these two channels, for SG1 (21:66% vs 4:50%, respect.) as
well as SG2 (26:66% vs 30:59, respect.). The percentage of claims led in the suspicious
period (dened as the last month of the policy year) is 8.49% in the non-DOA channel,
and it rises to 22:99% in the DOA channel. We may also observe that the share of the
RG group is signicantly lower in the DOA channel (13:73% vs 37:44%). Finally, the
percentage of deductible contracts sold through the DOA channel is smaller than that in
the non-DOA channel (54:61% vs 60:12%).
5 Testing hypotheses
5.1 Evidence on claim manipulation
We rstly test the hypothesis that the perspective of contract renewal and the choice of a
deductible contract are factors that stimulate fraud. We focus on the fraudulent behavior
that consists of manipulating the claim date by moving it to the last policy month, called
the "suspicious period", possibly by ling one claim for two events. We dene the fraud
18It is indeed well known in Taiwan that individuals with less favorable claim records (and thus with
a higher bonus-malus coe¢ cient) tend to purchase insurance through a DOA, and that some DOAs may
unduly protect their customers from a strict enforcement of the bonus-malus rule.
15
rate as the number of claims per policyholder led during the suspicious period, hence
the following wording of Hypothesis 1.19
Hypothesis 1: The fraud rate is higher in the suspicious group than in the non-
suspicious group, and this is particularly the case for individuals covered by deductible
contracts.
Testing Hypothesis 1 amounts to identifying whether there is a conditional dependence
between belonging to the suspicious group SG (or to one of its subgroups SG1 and SG2)
on one side, and ling a claim within the suspicious period (evaluated by the dummy SC)
on the other side. To do so, we use a two-stage method, similar to the approach followed
by Dionne et al. (1997, 2001).20 For notational simplicity, SG; SG1; SG2 also denote
dummies for belonging to suspicious groups SG; SG1 and SG2; respectively. deduct is a
dummy for deductible contracts. SG and deduct are estimated at Stage 1 by bivariate
Probit regressions, with an instrumental variable approach, with SG1 = SG(1 deduct)
and SG2 = SG  deduct. Stage 1 requires nding out some factors that are related to
the renewal and coverage decisions, in addition to the underwriting and pricing variables,
and that are unrelated to the decision of ling a suspicious claim.
Income and education may conceivably a¤ect the type of contract and the mobility
between insurers, but there is no obvious reason for which they should be related to the
decision of ling a claim during the last policy month. Thus, they are natural candidates
to be instruments at stage 1. Unfortunately, our database does not provide information
about the income and education levels of each policyholder. As approximations, we use
income and edu, that measure the average income and the percentage of the population
19Of course, this does not mean that all the claims led in the suspicious period are fraudulent.
20They aim at appraising whether the correlation between claims and coverage reects individuals
unobservable characteristics, which are not used by insurers in underwriting and pricing decisions. In
order to avoid a spurius correlation caused by misspecication, they add the conditional expectation of
one decision variable (such as ling a claim) when regressing on the other one (such as choosing the
insurance coverage). To avoid endogeneity problems, Dionne et al. (2009b) and Dionne et al. (2015)
estimate this conditional expectation through an instrumental variable approach.
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with a master or PhD degree, respectively, in the zip code area of the policyholder.21
Accordingly, at stage 1, bivariate Probit regressions are written as
Pr(SGi = 1jincomei; edui; Xi) = (1incincomei + 1eduedui + 1Xi + "SGi); (7)
Pr(deducti = 1jincomei; edui; Xi) = (2incincomei + 2eduedui + 2Xi + "dedti);
(8)
with cov("SGi; "dedti) =  and where Xi is the column vector of underwriting and pricing
variables for policyholder i, including: gender and age of the policyholder, usage, brand,
size and age of the insured vehicle, the bonus malus coe¢ cient and the premium level.
This is the rst group of explanatory variables in Table 1.
At stage 2 of the 2SLS approach, we estimate the probability that policyholders le
their rst claim during the suspicious period. We explore the conditional dependence
between SC and SG1 and between SC and SG2, by considering Pr(SG1i)  Pr(SGi =
1; deducti = 0) and Pr(SG2i)  Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 1) as explanatory variables in a
second stage Probit regression, which is written as
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i); RGi; Xi)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + rRGi + Xi); (9)
where SCi = 1 when policyholder i has led his rst claim during the suspicious period
and SCi = 0 otherwise. To control for the possibility that last policy-month claims may
result from a premium recouping behavior, we also use the control variable RGi (with
RGi = 1 when the contract is of type A or B and has not been subsequently renewed for
more than one year, and RGi = 0 otherwise). Here, also, Xi is the column vector that
21We have also tested the percentage of population with education levels higher than the bachelor
degree, or higher than the junior college. Using the percentage of inhabitants with a master or PhD
degree was the best way to measure the e¤ect of education on SG and deduct.
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contains rst group explanatory variables of Table 1.
Alternatively, as Dionne et al. (2015), we may also include dummies for the variables
instrumented at stage 1 among the explanatory variables of stage 2 regression. This
method (hereafter referred as the DGV approach) leads to write the stage 2 regression as
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i); SG1i; SG2i; RGi; Xi)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + s1SG1i + s2SG2i + rRGi + Xi):
(10)
In the 2SLS approach (regression (9)), the conditional dependence between SG1 and
SC as well as between SG2 and SC is evaluated through the estimated coe¢ cients of
Pr(SG1i) and Pr(SG2i), i.e., by instr1 and instr2, respectively. In the DGV approach
(regression (10)), the conditional dependence is evaluated by the overall sum of the es-
timated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1i) and SG1i and the sum of the estimated coe¢ cients of
Pr(SG2i) and SG2i, i.e., by instr1 + s1 and instr2 + s2, respectively.
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(Insert Table 3 here)
The rst stage bivariate Probit estimations are listed in the two rst columns of
Table 3, with intuitive results. Wealthier people have a lower probability of continuing
the same contract, and a higher probability of purchasing a deductible contract. This
is consistent with a decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption: in a setting where
individuals may have partial information on the quality of insurance contracts, less risk
22As a preliminary step, the 2SLS approach requires testing (1) whether there is a weak instrument
problem by the Anderson-Rubin test, (2) whether the instrument is over-identied by Sargans J test,
and nally (3) whether the instrumental variable method is relevant by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
Dionne et al. (2015) state that estimating the conditional probability of the instrumented variable
through LPM or through the Probit model is qualitatively consistent with the 2SLS approach. Estimating
Pr(SGi = 1jincomei; edui; Xi) and Pr(deducti = 1jincomei; edui; Xi) by two LPMs and performing these
three tests validates our IV approach. The results of these tests are in Table 8 in Section 2 of the Appendix.
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averse individuals are less reluctant to switch insurer, and they also tend to choose lower
coverage. Furthermore, the education level is negatively correlated with the deductible
dummy, that is highly educated people tend to purchase more insurance, and positively
correlated with the renewal decision. Members of the recoup group renew their contract
less frequently (which simply reects the denition of RG), and they tend to opt for
deductible contracts. We also see that the owners of larger vehicles are comparatively
more likely to renew their insurance contract and to opt for a contract with a deductible.
The results of the second-stage estimation by the 2SLS approach are reported in
the third column of Table 3. They show the conditional dependence between SC and
either SG1 or SG2, with coe¢ cients 0:6110 and 0:8021 that are signicant at the 10%
and 1% levels, respectively. The fourth column corresponds to the second stage of the
DGV approach. The estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1) and Pr(SG2) are signicantly
di¤erent from 0 at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively, which conrms the existence
of an endogeneity problem. The dummy variables SG1 and SG2 are also signicantly
di¤erent from 0 at the 10% and 1% thresholds, respectively, which conrms the conditional
dependency between SC and SG1 or SG2, with total coe¢ cients 1:8305 = 0:6094+1:2211
and 2:4919 = 0:7809 + 1:7110, respectively.
Thus, the 2SLS and DGV approaches lead to similar conclusions, and they conrm
our presumption of a positive conditional dependence between belonging to SG1 or SG2
and ling a rst claim during the suspicious period, which supports Hypothesis 1.23
23Table 3 also o¤ers some interesting byproducts that are worth mentioning. Firstly, the owners of new
vehicles tend to le their rst claim during the suspicious period, which reects the so-called "car wash"
phenomenon in Taiwan, that is the fact that purchasers of new cars may benet from a free visit to the car
repairer at the end of the rst year. As we will see, this is linked with the role of car dealers in insurance
fraud. Secondly, the policyholders from the RG group also tend to le their rst claims in the suspicious
period, which echoes the conclusions of Li et al. (2013). Thirdly, females le their rst claim during
the suspicious period more frequently than males, but that does not necessarily reect a gender e¤ect
in fraudulent behavior. It is usual in Taiwan to register cars under the name of females (e.g., a wife or
mother), even when the primary driver is a male, in order to benet from cheaper insurance premiums.
Hence, instead of a gender e¤ect, the above mentioned correlation may just reect the fact that the
policyholders who carefully manage their insurance budget may also try to obtain undue advantage from
their insurance company.
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If defrauders postpone their claims to the suspicious period and if they may cumulate
losses in a unique claim, then the suspicious period should be characterized by high values
of rst-claim cost ratios. This is expressed in Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: The rst-claim cost ratio is larger in the suspicious period than during
the rest of the policy year, particularly for the suspicious group.
Hypothesis 2 is tested through the following regression:
clmamti = cSCi + ffirsti + fsfirst  SCi + Xi; (11)
which is performed among the claims led by members of the SG group, where clmamti
is the value (in US dollars) of the claims led by policyholder i. In regression (11),
we use two additional variables (firsti and firsti  SCi) besides SCi and vector Xi.
firsti = 1 when this is the rst claim led by policyholder i during the policy year,
otherwise firsti = 0 and first  SCi is an interaction variable. We perform the above
test separately for SG1 and SG2. In our sample, this corresponds to 22,081 claims led
by 7,614 policyholders from SG1, and 25,434 claims led by 14,130 policyholders from
SG2. The estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term bfs is the key to test. We obtainbfs = 108:54 with p value 0.120 for SG1, and bfs = 238:09 with p value 0.035 for
SG2. To some extent, these results conrm the validity of Hypothesis 2, with a lower
signicance level for SG1 than for SG2.24 For the sake of completeness, we have also run
the regression that explains the value of the claims over the whole sample (not only the
SG group) by including dummies SG1i; SG2i; SCi; firsti; RGi and their double and triple
interaction terms in the explanatory variables. Results conrm the validity of Hypothesis
2 (see Section 2 in the Appendix).
24This is consistent with the fact that the policyholders with deductible contracts (i.e., the SG2 sub-
group) have a greater incentive to le a unique claim for two events than the policyholders with no-
deductible contracts (the SG1 subgroup).
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5.2 Robustness tests
1. To check the robustness of our conclusions, we have also tested Hypothesis 1 by
following an approach inspired from Chiappori and Salanié (2000). The results are
reported in Section 2 of the Appendix and they conrm our conclusion about the
conditional correlation between SG1 or SG2 and SC.
2. It is also worth investigating whether the validity of our conclusions can be a¤ected
by the hypothetical presence of (ex ante) moral hazard or adverse selection. Ex ante
moral hazard explains why a more comprehensive insurance coverage may make a
driver less cautious. This incentive e¤ect is even stronger for policyholders who had
no accidents before the suspicious period, because the bonus-malus system forgives
the rst accident. Hence, under the moral hazard hypothesis, the policyholders from
the SG1 group (i.e., those with a no-deductible contract) should be less cautious
than those from SG2 (the policyholders with a deductible contract), and according
to the moral hazard interpretation, they should have more severe rst accidents in
the last policy month. The comparison of coe¢ cients bfs in regression (11) for SG1
and SG2 leads to the opposite conclusion.
3. In a setting with adverse selection, past and future claim experiences may be linked,
but man-made claim manipulation should reduce the predictive power of this link.
Furthermore, adverse selection may lead to a positive correlation between the cover-
age and the probability of ling claims, but it does not induce any particular timing
for claims. These observations open the door to additional tests reported in Section
2 of the Appendix, which conrm that our conclusions on claim manipulation are
not called into question by hidden information on risk types.
4. Finally, we may also be worried by the fact that the SG2 group includes two types
of deductible contracts, with more extensive exclusions for type B than for type A.
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To control for any disturbances that may be linked to this di¤erence in the scope of
coverage, we have redone our tests by limiting our sample to type-B contracts, with
unchanged conclusions. Results are reported in Section 2 of the Appendix.
5.3 Evaluating the cost of fraud
Beyond the mere fact that fraud does exist, estimating its cost is also important. To do
this, we refer to the empirical results from the DGV model. The estimated coe¢ cients
of Pr(SG1) and SG1 are 0:6094 and 1:2211 (see the fourth column in Table 3), and
their marginal e¤ects are 0:1664 and 0:3335, respectively. This implies that, overall, the
probability of ling a claim in the suspicious period increases by 49:99% when comparing
a policyholder from the SG1 group to those in the non-suspicious group. The average
cost of non-detected fraudulent claims is US$199 (NT$5; 970) if we presume that fraud
is committed by ling a unique claim for two events, postponed to the last month of
the policy year to avoid the penalty from the bonus-malus rule.25 This implies that the
di¤erence in annual fraud cost between members of the SG1 group and policyholders
from the non-suspicious group is about 199 0:4999 =US$99:48. Likewise, the estimated
coe¢ cients of Pr(SG2) and SG2 are 0:7809 and 1:7110, with marginal e¤ects 0:2133 and
0:4673, respectively. This implies that the probability of ling a claim in the suspicious
period increases by 68:06% when we compare members of the SG2 group to policyholders
from the non-suspicious group. The average cost of a fraudulent claim is US$365:67, once
again with the assumption that defrauders le a unique claim for two events and postpone
their claim to the last month of their policy year.26 This implies that the policyholders
25The average insurance premium in our research sample is NT$ 14,925 (US$497.5). We may roughly
estimate that the defrauders who le a unique claim for two events and postpone their claim to the last
month of their policy year avoid about 40% of this amount.
26This cost includes the avoided deductible and the avoided bonus-malus penalty. The deductibles of
rst and second claims are NT$3; 000 and NT$5; 000 respectively, hence there is a NT$5; 000 fraud
cost when policyholders le a unique claim to cover two accidents. Adding the NT$5; 970 avoided
penalty due to the increase in premium to the deductible of the second claim yields a total fraud cost of
22
from the SG2 group entail an expected cost of fraud that is about US$248:87 higher
than for the insured from the non-suspicious group. Since there are 7; 614 and 14; 130
policyholders in SG1 and SG2, respectively, we may deduce that the expected cost of
fraud is about US$4; 273; 974 which represents 11:54% of the total premiums paid by the
policyholders from our sample (US$37 million). These are of course very crude estimates,
but they give an idea of the cost of fraud through claims manipulation in Taiwan.
5.4 On the role of DOAs
Our third hypothesis relates the fraud rate to the insurance distribution channel.
Hypothesis 3: The fraud rate in the suspicious group is comparatively even larger
when insurance has been purchased through the DOA channel than through other distrib-
ution channels.
Testing the validity of Hypothesis 3 will follow the same approach as for Hypothesis
1. Dummy Di indicates that policyholder i has purchased insurance through the DOA
channel, and now three endogenous variables, SGi; deducti and Di; must be instrumented
in the 2SLS approach. As previously, SGi and deducti are instrumented by incomei and
edui through Probit regressions, leading to Pr(SG1i)  Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 1) and
Pr(SG2i)  Pr(SGi = 1; deducti = 0): Furthermore, edui and incomei are also candidate
instruments for Di, because people with high income and high education level may have
larger search costs, which may lead them to purchase insurance from a DOA. This is
particularly the case when individuals purchase a new car, hence a third instrumental
variable newi, which indicates that the insured vehicle is less than three years old. Thus,
NT$10; 970(US$365:67).
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Di is instrumented by:
Pr(Di = 1jincomei; edui; newi; Xi)
= (3incincomei + 
3
eduedui + 
3
newnewi + 
3Xi): (12)
Stage 2 of the 2SLS approach is now written as:
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i);Pr(Di); RGi;Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i);
Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i);Pr(Di) RGi; Xi)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + D Pr(Di) + rRGi
+ Dinstr1 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) + Dinstr2 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) + Dr Pr(Di) RGi + Xi);
(13)
with Pr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i), and Pr(Di)  Pr(Di = 1) being estimated at stage 1. In
particular, we include interaction terms Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) and Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) in
order to evaluate whether the conditional dependence between SG1 and SC and between
SG2 and SC are comparatively higher in the DOA channel. The premium recouping
e¤ect and its interaction with the DOA channel are also taken into account through RGi
and Pr(Di) RGi, respectively.
At Stage 2 of the DGV approach, the explanatory variables include the dummy vari-
ables SG1i; SG2i and the two estimated variables Pr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i), with interaction
terms to assess whether the conditional dependence between SG1 and SC and between
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SG2 and SC is a¤ected by the DOA channel. This is written as:
Pr(SCi = 1jPr(SG1i);Pr(SG2i); SG1i; SG2i;Pr(Di); RGi;Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i);
Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i);Pr(Di)  SG1i;Pr(Di)  SG2i;Pr(Di) RGi; Xi)
= (instr1 Pr(SG1i) + instr2 Pr(SG2i) + S1SG1i + S2SG2i + D Pr(Di) + rRGi
+ Dinstr1 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) + Dinstr2 Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) + DS1 Pr(Di)  SG1i
+ DS2 Pr(Di)  SG2i + Dr Pr(Di) RGi +Xi):
The results are in Table 4.27 The rst column lists the estimated coe¢ cients of the
rst stage regression for Pr(D): they conrm that individuals living in areas with high
average income and high education level tend to purchase insurance through the DOA
channel. This is also the case for the owners of vehicles that are less than three years old.
The 2SLS and DGV Probit regressions for SC are in the second and third columns. In
the 2SLS Probit model, the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1) and Pr(SG2) are 0:6522 and
1:7631, and they are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
The estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(SG1) Pr(D )and Pr(SG2)Pr(D) are 0:1067 and 0:3805,
and they are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 10% and 1 % level. All in all, this conrms
that there is a signicant conditional dependence between belonging to the suspicious
group and ling claims during the suspicious period. This conditional dependence is even
stronger among the insured who have purchased insurance through the DOA channel, and
these e¤ects are stronger for SG2 than for SG1. In other words, we may conclude that the
fraud phenomenon associated with the claim date manipulation does exist, and that it is
more severe among those individuals with deductible contracts and who have purchased
insurance through the DOA channel, which conrms the prediction from Hypothesis 3.
27Here we have also checked the robustness of our IV method by using two sets of 2SLS-LPM and by
checking that the null hypothesis of irrelevant model is rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the
null hypothesis of exogenous instrumental variable cannot be rejected by the Anderson-Rubin test, and
the null hypothesis of no-over identication cannot be rejected by the J test.
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(Insert Table 4 here)
The third column of Table 4 corresponds to the DGV model. The results conrm our
previous conclusions on the role of DOAs in the fraud process.28 Furthermore, whatever
the distribution channel, the SG2 coe¢ cients are larger than their SG1 equivalents, which
conrms that deductible contracts exacerbate fraudulent behaviors.
Calculation shows that the marginal e¤ect of the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(Di)SG1i
and Pr(Di)  Pr(SG1i) are equal to 0:1167 and 0:0439, which implies that, in the SG1
group, the probability of ling a claim during the suspicious period is 16.06% larger
when policyholders have purchased insurance through the DOA channel than through
another channel. Thus, if the expected cost of a fraudulent claim by an SG1 policyholder
is US$199, as we have already estimated, then the expected fraudulent claim cost of
such policyholders is 199 0:1606 =US$31:96 larger when insurance has been purchased
through the DOA channel than through another channel. Similarly, the marginal e¤ect
of the estimated coe¢ cients of Pr(Di)  SG2i and Pr(Di)  Pr(SG2i) are equal to 0:1599
and 0:0545, thus with a 21.44% larger probability of ling a claim in the suspicious period
for a member of the SG2 group who has purchased insurance through the DOA channel
rather than through another channel. For an expected cost of fraudulent claims in the
SG2 group equal to US$365:67, this amounts to an increase of US$78:40 in the expected
cost of fraud when an SG2 policyholder takes out insurance from a DOA rather than
through another distribution channel.
At the end, we may calculate the increase in fraud cost for each suspicious subgroup
by comparison with the non-suspicious group, by weighting each subgroup with the corre-
sponding number of policyholders. For example, 6; 759 policyholders in SG1 have taken
out insurance through the DOA channel, with an expected increase in fraudulent claiming
28In particular, the estimated coe¢ cients of interaction terms Pr(D)  Pr(SG1) and Pr(D)  Pr(SG2)
are equal to 0.1997 and 0.2475, respectively, and they are signicant at the 5% and 1% level. Similar
conclusions are obtained for Pr(D)  SG1 and Pr(D)  SG2, with signicance levels of 1% , respectively.
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of US$108:71,29 and hence a total additional cost of US$734; 771. Similar calculations for
the other cases yield the following results:
Increase
in the cost of fraud
DOA Non-DOA
SG1 6; 759 108:71 = $734; 771 855 76:75 = $65; 621
SG2 8; 319 253:63 = $2; 109; 948 5; 811 175:23 = $1; 018; 262
SG1 + SG2 $2; 844; 719 $1; 083; 883
Overall, the suspicious policyholders in SG1 and SG2 who have purchased insurance
through the DOA (respect. non-DOA) channel are at the origin of an increase in the cost of
fraud that can be estimated at US$2; 844; 719 (respect.US$1; 083; 883), which corresponds
to 13:72% (respect. 6:66%) of the premium written by this company for this line of
business through DOAs (respect. non-DOAs).3031
Remark 1: A legitimate question that may arise is whether the higher expected cost
of claims in the DOA channel comes from fraudulent behaviors, as we have argued so
far, or whether it rather reects the fact that, on average, the individuals who take out
insurance from DOAs have higher risks. An additional test, whose results are reported in
the Appendix, shows that this not the case. In other words, the increase in claim costs
29According to the DGVmodel, the increase in the probability of ling a fraudulent claim by members of
the SG1 subgroup who have purchased insurance through the DOA channel, in comparison with members
of the non-suspicious group, is 0:1066+0:2791+0:0439+0:1167 = 0:5463. Hence, the additional expected
fraud cost: 199 0:5463 =US$108:71.
30In 2010, for this line of business, premiums written by this company through DOAs and non-DOAs
amounted to USD20.73 and 16.27 million, respectively.
31Apart from these main results, Table 4 also provides two interesting by-products that are common to
the 2SLS and DGV Probit models. Firstly, the estimated coe¢ cient of RGi is positive and signicantly
di¤erent from 0, at least at the 1% level, which conrms the existence of the premium recouping behavior.
However, the estimated coe¢ cients of the interaction term RGi Pr(Di) have negative signs that are not
signicant. Thus, compared to other distribution channels, DOAs do not particularly help opportunistic
policyholders to recoup premiums at the end of the policy year. Their behavior, as an act of collusion,
rather focuses on the manipulation of the claim date. Secondly, the estimated coe¢ cient of femalei
is positive and signicant. This conrms that fraudulent behaviors may be widespread among those
individuals who carefully manage their budget, since the declared gender of the owner of the car may
be manipulated to take advantage of a lower premium. This is consistent with our previous observation
made on Table 3.
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is not an intrinsic characteristic of the distribution channel: it reects the fraudulent
behaviors of some policyholders (the suspicious groups) who may take advantage of the
manipulation of claims, and this behavior is facilitated by DOAs.
6 Conclusion
This paper has focused attention on the policyholder-service provider coalition in insur-
ance mechanisms: how it can a¤ect the credibility of claim auditing, how several patterns
of fraud may emerge in the car insurance market, and how service providers and poli-
cyholders may draw benet from such a coalition. The important role of car dealers in
Taiwan provides an exceptional opportunity to analyze this interaction between insurer,
policyholder and provider.
Indeed, the economic analysis of insurance fraud is usually based on a very abstract
picture of claims fraud (ling a fraudulent claim although no accident has occurred, or
exagerating a claim), but in practice understanding insurance fraud often requires a much
more specic analysis of the claims fraud process. The Taiwan case o¤ers such a possibility,
with fraud frequently taking place through the manipulation of the claims date in order
to avoid a penalty from the bonus-malus system and to reduce the burden of a second
deductible, should another accident occur.
We hope to have brought convincing evidence that the intertemporal manipulation of
claims is actually a signicant determinant of insurance fraud in Taiwan. In particular,
policyholders with deductible contracts who intend to renew their policies (the suspicious
group) have a larger propensity to defraud than other policyholders, by postponing their
claims until the last month of the policy year, and possibly by merging two events into
a single claim. Consequently, there is an increase in the average cost of rst claims
led by the suspicious group in the last month of the policy year. Furthermore, the
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collusion between policyholders and DOAs is a crucial mechanism that contributes to the
development of fraud in the Taiwanese car insurance market.
The size of claim manipulation in the Taiwan insurance market and the role of DOAs
are so signicant that it is hard to believe that insurers are unaware of them. Informal
exchanges with the industry conrm that this is the case. Of course, there may be
di¤erent views of the underlying mechanisms, varying from granting small advantages to
policyholders in order to build customers loyalty and closing ones eyes to false small claims
- i.e., the end of year "car wash" and the recouping money behavior, respectively - up
to organized large scale insurance fraud through claim manipulation and collusion with
car repairers. All these components of customers misbehaviors are likely to coexist. The
lack of response of Taiwan insurers concerned is more striking. Our analysis suggest that
it is in fact very di¢ cult to incentivize DOAs through contractual mechanisms so that
ghting fraud would be in their own interest. The main revenue of DOAs comes from
the sales of new vehicles and from the activity of their repair shops. Although DOAs
are major intermediaries in the Taiwan insurance market, selling insurance is for most
of them mainly a way to improve their relationships with car buyers, it is not their core
business. Reducing the intensity of fraud through the DOA channel would in fact require
a structural reorganization that would be very costly to insurers. Integrating DOAs as
part and parcel of the rm (i.e., regrouping the insurance activity and the sales of cars
within a common holding company) might completely change the story. It would reduce
the bargaining power of DOAs and, presumably, it would also allow insurers to reduce the
asymmetry of information with their DOAs by implementing regular cost reviews, instead
of triggering costly audits on a case by case basis, and with the insurer in a position of
weakness. Other Taiwanese insurers have made that choice. The size of fraud in the
Taiwan automobile insurance market should persuade insurers that comparing the costs
and benets of these decentralized and integrated schemes is of utmost importance.
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Figure 1:  Distribution of claims and average claim cost (first claims) 
in the policy year 
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Figure 2:  Distribution of the first claims among calendar months 
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Figure 3:  Distribution of all claims among twelve calendar months 
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Figure 4:  Average cost of first claims / Average cost of all claims  
Comparing the suspicious group and type C contracts 
  
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
2
SG1_first/ SG1_all
SG2_first/ SG2_all
typC_first/typeC_all
  
Figure 5:  Distribution of claims during the policy year 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Explained variable: 
SG Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to the “suspicious group”,1 and 
0 otherwise. 
SG1 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to “suspicious group 1”,2 and 0 
otherwise. 
SG2 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to “suspicious group 2”,3 and 0 
otherwise. 
deduct Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured has taken out a deductible contract, and 0 
otherwise. 
SC Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured has filed his or her first claim during the 
suspicious period (in the last policy month), 0 otherwise. 
First group of explanatory variables: underwriting and pricing factors 
female Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is a female, 0 otherwise. 
age2025 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is in the 20-25 age group, 0 otherwise. 
age2530 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is in the 25-30 age group, 0 otherwise . 
age3060 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is in the 30-60 age group, 0 otherwise. 
ageabv60 Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insured is older than 60, 0 otherwise. 
carage0 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is less than one year old, 0 otherwise. 
carage1 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is two years old, 0 otherwise. 
carage2 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is three years old, 0 otherwise. 
carage3 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is four years old, 0 otherwise. 
carage4 Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is more than four years old, 0 otherwise. 
veh_m Dummy variable equal to 1 when the capacity of the insured car is between 1800 and 
2000 c.c., 0 otherwise. 
veh_l Dummy variable equal to 1 when the capacity of the insured car is larger than 2000, 0 
otherwise. 
tramak_j Dummy variable equal to 1 when the brand of the insured car is j, with j=n, f, h, t, c, 
                                                 
1 The “suspicious group” (SG) includes the individuals who purchased type A or B contract and 
renewed their contract with the same insurance company. The counter group for SG includes the 
policyholders who purchased type C contract or who did not renew their contract with the same 
insurance company. 
2 The “suspicious group 1” (SG1) includes the SG group policyholders with no-deductible contract. 
The counter group for SG1 includes the policyholders who purchased type C contract and who did not 
renew their contract with the same insurance company, or who belong to SG2. 
3 The “suspicious group 2” (SG2) includes the policyholders with deductible contract who renewed 
their contract with the same insurance company. The counter group for SG2 includes the policyholders 
who purchased type C contract and who did not renew their contract with the same insurance company, 
or who belong to SG1.  
and 0 otherwise.4 
sedan Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial or for 
long-term rental purposes, and 0 otherwise.5 
logprem Logarithm of the premium (in US dollars) of the contract in the current contract year. 
bonus Bonus-malus coefficient used to calculate the premium in the current contract year. It 
is a multiplier on the premium. Hence, it is a discount if it is smaller than 1 and it is a 
penalty if it is larger than 1. 
Explanatory variables (second group): 
income     Average income in the policyholder’s residential area. 
edu        Percentage of inhabitants with a PhD or a master degree in the policyholder’s 
residential area. 
new       Dummy variable equal to 1 when the car is less or equal to three year old, and 0 
otherwise. 
D Dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurance contract is sold through the DOA channel, 
and 0 otherwise. 
A Dummy variable equal to 1 for a type A contract, and 0 otherwise. 
B Dummy variable equal to 1 for a type B contract, and 0 otherwise.6 
RG Dummy variable equal to 1 when the insured belongs to the “recoup group”,7 and 0 
otherwise. 
                                                 
4 The counter group for tramak_j, j= n, f, h, t, c corresponds to brands other than Nissan, Ford, Honda, 
Toyota, and China. 
5 The counter group includes cars that are not small sedans, for example small or large trucks, 
cargos…etc. 
6 The counter groups for A and B are type C contracts. 
7 The “recoup group” includes the policyholders who are covered by type A or B contracts and who 
did not renew their contract or renewed it for only one year. 
Table 2-1: Structures of the whole sample and of the sub-sample with claims 
 Whole sample 
(A) 
Sub-sample with 
claims (B) 
Difference 
(B)-(A) 
claim 0.4586   
SC  0.1751  
RG 0.1980 0.2847 0.0897*** 
deduct 0.3602 0.5670 -0.2068*** 
A 0.0103 0.0152 0.0049*** 
B 0.3882 0.6742 0.2860*** 
SG 0.2625 0.4332 0.1707*** 
SG1 0.1177 0.1517 0.0340*** 
SG2 0.1448 0.2815 0.1367*** 
D 0.5078 0.6216 0.1138*** 
female 0.7118 0.7392 0.0274*** 
age2025 0.0030 0.0028 -0.0002 
age2530 0.0342 0.0370 0.0028*** 
age3060 0.8947 0.8951 0.0004 
ageabv60 0.0679 0.0651 -0.0028** 
carage0 0.2192 0.2756 0.0566*** 
carage1 0.1381 0.1891 0.0510*** 
carage2 0.0915 0.1025 0.0110*** 
carage3 0.1109 0.1062 -0.0047*** 
carage4 0.0986 0.0842 -0.0144*** 
veh_m 0.2875 0.2626 -0.0249*** 
veh_l 0.2692 0.2849 0.0157*** 
sedan 0.9166 0.9325 0.0159*** 
logprem 5.8240 6.2096 0.3856*** 
bonus 0.7180 0.8028 0.0848*** 
No of obs. 109,461 50,194 
 
Notes 
(1) The information on car brands in the two samples is not reported for confidentiality reasons. 
(2) ***,** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2-2: Structure of the DOA and non-DOA subsamples 
 DOA 
(A) 
Non-DOA 
(B) 
Difference 
(A)-(B) 
SC 0.2299 0.0849 0.1450*** 
RG 0.1373 0.3744 -0.2371*** 
deduct 0.5461 0.6012 -0.0551*** 
A 0.0145 0.0164 -0.0019* 
B 0.7190 0.6007 0.3183*** 
SG 0.4832 0.3509 0.1323*** 
SG1 0.2166 0.0450 0.1716*** 
SG2 0.2666 0.3059 -0.0393*** 
female 0.7597 0.7052 0.0546*** 
age2025 0.0027 0.0036 -0.0009 
age2530 0.0393 0.0333 0.0060*** 
age3060 0.8974 0.8913 0.0062** 
ageabv60 0.0603 0.0730 -0.01267*** 
carage0 0.3916 0.0850 0.3066*** 
carage1 0.2203 0.1379 0.0824*** 
carage2 0.1021 0.1033 -0.0012 
carage3 0.0890 0.1344 -0.0454*** 
carage4 0.0601 0.1239 -0.0638*** 
veh_m 0.2287 0.3183 -0.0896*** 
veh_l 0.2878 0.2800 0.0078* 
tramak_n 0.0058 0.0098 -0.0039*** 
tramak_f 0.0377 0.0763 0.0386*** 
tramak_h 0.0561 0.0994 -0.0433*** 
tramak_t 0.6464 0.3388 0.3076*** 
tramak_c 0.0070 0.0601 -0.0532*** 
sedan 0.9492 0.9050 0.0442*** 
logprem 6.4674 5.7862 0.6812 
bonus 0.8708 0.6909 0.1799*** 
No of obs. 31,203 18,991 
 
 
Note 
(1) ***,** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3: Empirical evidence of fraud  
 
 First stage (bivariate 
Probit) 
Second stage 
 SG deduct 2SLS-Probit DGV-Probit 
constant -1.6092*** -2.6576*** -4.6113*** -4.2856*** 
Pr(SG1)   0.6110* 0.6094* 
Pr(SG2)   0..8021***  0.7809*** 
SG1    1.2211* 
SG2    1.7110*** 
income  -8.93E-06*** 2.71E-05***   
edu 0.2733* -1.7944***   
RG -0.4377***  0.4810*** 0.3937*** 0.4524*** 
female 0.1525 *** -0.0913*** 0.0695***  0.0559*** 
age2530 0.4104 0.3272 0.4801***  0.4548*** 
age3060 0.5899 0.2349  0.5643***  0.5269*** 
ageabv60 0.6027 0.2977  0.4463***  0.4199*** 
carage0 0.7029***  0.1488*** 0.8574***  0.8735* 
carage1 0.4539*** 0.0757** 0.0450  0.0521  
carage2 0.3554* 0.0981*** 0.0097  0.0152  
carage3 0.2864* 0.0971*** -0.0087  -0.0059  
carage4 0.1370  0.0376 -0.0149  -0.0134  
veh_m 0.0228 0.0338 -0.1252***  -0.1100*** 
veh_l 0.3493*** 0.3530*** -0.3165***  -0.2838*** 
sedan 0.2085*** 0.2249*** -0.1735***  -0.1568*** 
logprem 0.6398*** 0.0623*** 0.5673***  0.4937*** 
bonus -0.8046*** -0.0520*** -1.0049***  -0.9060*** 
Pseudo R2  0.5523 0.2035 0.2043 
 
Notes 
(1) Pr(SG1i) and Pr(SG2i) are the estimated probabilities of belonging to the suspicious groups SG1 and 
SG2, respectively, calculated at the first stage, that is Pr(SG1i) = Prob(SGi=1, deducti=0), and 
Pr(SG2i) = Prob(SGi=1, deducti=1). In the DGV-probit model, SG1 and SG2 are dummy variables 
for belonging to the suspicious groups SG1 and SG2, respectively. 
(2) In all the above regressions, we have also controlled for the brand of the insured car. This is not 
reported for confidentiality reasons. 
(3) ***,** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
(4) We have also performed two sets of the 2SLS-LPM to confirm the validity of our IV model. In both 
sets, the null hypothesis of irrelevant model is rejected by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the null 
hypothesis of exogenous instrumental variable cannot be rejected by the Anderson-Rubin test, the null 
hypothesis of no over identification cannot be rejected by the J test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Empirical evidence of fraud through DOAs 
 First stage  
      D   
        Second stage 
 2SLS-Probit DGV-Probit 
constant -2.8831*** -4.8600*** -4.4864*** 
Pr(SG1)  0.6522* 0.4844* 
Pr(SG2)  1.7631*** 0.6105*** 
SG1   1.2686*** 
SG2   1.5675*** 
Pr(D)  0.1879 -0.1702 
Pr(D)*Pr(S
G1) 
 
0.1067* 0.1997* 
Pr(D)*Pr(S
G2) 
 
0.3805***  0.2475** 
Pr(D)*SG1   0.5306*** 
Pr(D)*SG2   0.7269*** 
income 1.72E-05***    
edu 3.6226***   
new 0.2170***   
RG 0.2383*** 0.4328*** 0.4814*** 
Pr(D)*RG  -0.0183 -0.0108 
female 0.0934*** 0.0787*** 0.0605*** 
age2530 0.1786  0.4987*** 0.4659*** 
age3060 0.4100*** 0.6037*** 0.5597*** 
ageabv60 0.3697*** 0.4825*** 0.4514*** 
carage0 0.9477*** 0.9566*** 1.0231*** 
carage1 0.5248*** 0.1089** 0.1538*** 
carage2 0.3694*** 0.0536  0.0860* 
carage3 0.2418* 0.0144  0.0350  
carage4 0.1416 -0.0023  0.0093  
veh_m -0.1285*** -0.1322*** -0.1138***  
veh_l -0.2397*** -0.3403*** -0.2962*** 
sedan 0.0069 -0.1788*** -0.1502*** 
logprem 0.3610***  0.6011*** 0.5016*** 
bonus 0.2463 *** -0.9725*** -0.8045*** 
Pseudo R2  0.2390 0.2040 0.2054 
Same notes as in Table 3 
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1 A model of insurance fraud with policyholder-car repairer
collusion
For the sake of brevity, Section 3 of the paper is limited to a simple insurance fraud model,
in which the choice of the insurance contract and of the distribution channel are left un-
explained. It is just mentioned that the level of the deductible reects the policyholders
risk aversion, and that individuals have some preferences for a specic distribution channel.
Furthermore, the collusion process involving policyholders and car repairers is not precisely
described in this model. We here develop an integrated model where these issues are ex-
plicitely analyzed. The model presented in the paper may be viewed as a simplied version
of this integrated model.
1.1 Notations
We consider an economy with a competitive insurance market, in which automobile insurance
can be purchased either through car dealers who act as insurance agents (DOAs) or through
independent insurance agents. Car dealers also own auto repair shops. Accidents may be
minor or severe, with repair costs ` and 2` whatever the car repairer, for minor and serious
accidents respectively, and also an uninsurable loss " per accident.1 Insurance policies consist
of a premium P and possibly a deductible d for each accident.2 Insurance pricing includes
1Assuming that the insurable costs of severe accidents exactly double those of minor accidents simplies
the notations of the model. We could more generally assume that severe accidents cost more than minor
accidents. The repair shop market is competitive, so that policyholders can let their car be repaired at
competitive price ` or 2` whatever the insurance distribution channel. The uninsurable loss " corresponds to
earnings losses, time value, daily life disruption or stress incurred in the case of an accident. This loss does
not play a signicant role in our theoretical analysis, but it makes it possible for some individuals to choose a
deductible contract while others prefer a full coverage contract (in what follows, the type 1 and 2 individuals
respectively), which will t our empirical analysis of the Taiwan automobile insurance market.
2The fact that deductibles are per accident follows the usual practice of car insurance companies (of course
not only in Taiwan), although it does not correspond to an optimal insurance contract design. This feature of
automobile insurance probably reects the increase in transaction costs that would be induced by aggregate
deductibles over the whole period covered by the contract. For notational simplicity, we assume that the
deductible is the same for the rst and second claims. In Taiwan, second claims have larger deductibles than
the rst one that occurred during the same policy year, which may be viewed as an incentive device in a
moral hazard setting (see Li et al, 2007).
1
constant proportional loading , and insurers may o¤er di¤erent policies through car dealers
and through other distribution channels.
Each individual may su¤er from 0, 1 or, at most, 2 accidents during the policy year. Let
1 and 2 be respectively the probability of 1 and 2 accidents, with 0 < 1 + 2 < 1. Each
accident is minor with probability qm and severe with probability qs, with qm + qs = 1. The
policy year is divided in two sub-periods, which are called the non-suspicious period (NSP)
and the suspicious period (SP), respectively, because, as we will see, ling a claim in SP may
be a signal of fraud. Any accident occurs in SP with probability , with 0 <  < 1.3
There are two types of individuals with the same initial wealth w: type 1 has a larger
degree of absolute risk aversion than type 1. Let wf be the individuals nal wealth. uh(wf )
denotes the type h von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (with h = 1 or 2), and we
assume u0h > 0 and u
00
h < 0, and
 u
00
1(wf )
u01(wf )
>  u
00
2(wf )
u02(wf )
;
for all wf . Let h be the proportion of type h individuals, with 1 + 2 = 1. Car repairers
are risk neutral.
We also assume that individuals have di¤erentiated preferences between purchasing in-
surance through a car dealer or through an independent agent. In particular, individuals who
have high search costs may prefer to purchase insurance through car dealers because often
purchasing a new car goes together with taking out a new insurance policy. This is modelled
as in a Hotelling game. Both types of individuals are uniformly located on the interval [0; 1].
A representative DOA and another representative independent insurance agent are located
at the extremities of the [0; 1] segment: the DOA is at x = xD = 0 and owns a repair shop,
while the the other distribution channel is at x = xA = 1.
Purchasing insurance entails a search disutility which is proportional at rate t to the
distance covered to 0 and 1 according to the distribution channel. Thus, the expected utility
of a type h customer located at x 2 [0; 1] with contract (P; d) is
uh(P; d)  t jx  xij ;
3For instance, if SP corresponds to the last policy month, and if accidents are uniformly distributed over
the policy year, then  = 1=12.
2
where
uh(P; d)  (1 1 2)uh(w P ) +1uh(w P  d  ") +2uh(w P   2d  2"); (A-1)
for h = 1 or 2, with i = D if that customer purchases insurance through the representative
DOA and i = A if he goes through the other distribution channel.
Type 1 individuals have a larger propensity to purchase insurance coverage than type 2
since they are more risk averse. Because of these di¤erentiated preferences, insurers o¤er
menus of contracts. Let (Pih; dih) be the insurance contract that is taken out by type h
individuals, with i = A or D according to the distribution channel.
1.2 The fraud mechanism
Fraud is analyzed as the behavior of oppportunistic policyholders who delay their claims to
SP, with the complicity of a car repairer. We consider a very simple form of the opportunistic
policyholder-car repairer collusive game. The policyholder makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er
to the car repairer in which he o¤ers to pay a xed amount G to the repairer and he keeps
the residual part of the collusive gain. Because of the bonus-malus system, type 1 and 2
policyholders may commit such a fraud in order to avoid paying a higher premium during
the next policy year: v denotes the discounted value of the savings in future insurance
premiums induced by such a bonus-malus fraud. Only those individuals who plan to renew
their contract with the same insurer may prot from such a bonus-malus fraud. We assume
that they make up a proportion  2 (0; 1) of the policyholders (whatever their type).
We also assume that postponing a minor claim requires that another minor loss actually
occurs during the same policy year, so that the total losses may be presented as the outcome
of a single severe accident. Policyholders also get an additional advantage from fraud by
reducing the retained cost from 2dih to dih. Thus, if fraud has been committed and is not
detected, the collusive gain is dih+ v or dih if the claim is led in SP or NSP, respectively. It
is shared between repairer and policyholder as amounts GSP and dih+v GSP or GNSP and
dih  GNSP , where GSP and GNSP denote the transfer to the repairer when the fraudulent
claim is led in SP and NSP , respectively .
Thus, if a minor accident occurs in NSP, then the policyholder may decide not to im-
3
mediately le a claim for this accident. Two possible cases are then possible.4 If another
minor accident occurs later during the same policy year, then the policyholder may le a
single large claim for the two accidents (called a "fraudulent claim" in what follows), which
requires collusion with a car repairer. Auditing large claims allows the insurer to detect such
instances of fraud. We denote as ci the cost of an audit when insurance is purchased from
i 2 fD;Ag. The fact that the car dealer owns the repair shop makes collusion all the easier.
Thus, we assume that auditing claims is more costly (or, put di¤erently, it is more di¢ cult
to establish colludersfraud) when insurance is purchased from D than from A.5 We thus
assume cD > cA. If there is no other minor accident, then the insurer considers that any late
claim (for the rst accident) is invalid and is dismissed. If a policyholder is caught ling a
fraudulent claim through a collusive agreement with the repairer, then he has to pay a ne
B, and he does not receive a indemnity, and the repairer pays a ne B0. For simplicity, nes
are determined exogenously by law. They are entirely paid to the State budget and are not
part of the insurers income. They may also be interpreted as the litigation costs incurred
by the policyholder and the car repairer when fraud is discovered.6
1.3 Fraud-audit interaction
Let ih 2 [0; 1] be the fraud rate of type h 2 f1; 2g individuals who purchase inurance from
i 2 fA;Dg. This is the fraction of type h policyholders who decide not to immediately le a
claim when a minor accident occurs in NSP, hoping for a future collusive agreement with a car
repairer, should another minor accident occur in SP.7 Let b = 2=(1+2) be the probability
4Bear in mind that in what follows we neglect the possibility of more than two accidents for the same
policyholder. We also assume that there are only two types of acccidents (minor or severe) with repair costs
of ` and 2`, respectively. Thus, we do not contemplate the possibility of presenting, say, a minor accident
and a serious accident as an extreme accident with cost 3`. In other words, the falsication of claims only
consists of announcing one single severe accident instead of two minor accidents.
5For example, in the DOA case, the hidden transfer G may take the form of a promise to purchase a new
car in the near future.
6 In practice, when fraud is discovered, the policyholder-repairer coalition has some bargaining power that
may allow its members to escape the penalties. This is particularly the case when insurance has been purchased
from a DOA, because the latter is in a position to threaten the insurer with redirecting its (presumably large)
customer base toward another insurer. This is another reason why deterring fraud may be more di¢ cult
when insurance has been taken out through a DOA than through a standard agent. The e¤ects of agents
bargaining power on the enforcement of fraud penalties is analyzed in Section 1.6 of this Appendix, and for
the sake of presentation simplicity is not taken into account here.
7We may check that policyholders would not take advantage of colluding with a repairer if a second accident
occurs during the non-suspicious period.
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of having a second accident, conditionally on the occurence of a rst accident in NSP.8 Such
an accident will occur in SP with probability , and it will be minor with probability qm.
Thus, if a rst minor acccident occurs in NSP, then a future collusive agreement with a car
repairer will be possible with probability qmb. The audit of serious claims may detect such
fraud. These audits are triggered with probability ih 2 [0; 1].9 In short, ih and ih for
i = A;D and h = 1; 2 are the policyholders and insurers strategies, respectively.
The expected utility of a type h policyholder who does not immediately le a claim after
a rst (minor) accident in NSP is written as:10
EuFih = qmb[(1  ih)uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  GSP )
+ihuh(w   Pih   2`  2" GSP  B)]
qmb(1  )[(1  ih)uh(w   Pih   dih   2" GNSP )
+ihuh(w   Pih   2`  2" GNSP  B)]
+bqsuh(w   Pih   `  dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   `  "):
This formula may be interpreted as follows. If the policyholder does not immediately le
a claim after a minor accident in NSP, he will have the opportunity to defraud if there is
another minor accident. This second accident will occur in SP or NSP with probability qmb
or qmb(1   ), respectively. In these cases, either the claim is audited or not, respectively
with probabilities ih and 1  ih. If there is no audit, then the policyholder receives either
dih+v GSP or dih GNSP , which is his share of the collusive deal, in addition to his status
quo net wealth w   Pih   2dih (i.e., the policyholders wealth in the case of two accidents
without fraud). If there is an audit, then no indemnity is paid by the insurer, and the
policyholder pays the ne B and does not recoup his side-payment GSP or GNSP . If no
8For simplicity, we do not condition this probability on the exact date at which the rst accident occurs.
In other words, we consider the non-suspicious period as a whole.
9We will assume that all serious claims (for i and h given) are audited with the same probability ih.
In other words, the audit frequency is not conditional on whether the claim is led during the suspicious
or non-suspicious period. This seems to be a realistic assumption insofar as the beginning of the policy
year varies across individuals, and conditioning auditing on the date of the claim in the policy year of each
individual would probably entail substantial transaction costs. Be that as it may, concentrating audits on the
suspicious period individual by individual would increase the e¢ ciency of the fraud deterrence mechanism,
but this would not qualitatively a¤ect our conclusions.
10The formula would be almost unchanged if the rst accident also occurs in the suspicious period. In such
a case, the gain from collusion would be lower (v should be replaced by a lower collusive gain v0) because the
advantage from bonus-malus fraud would be lower. Consequently, defrauding by ling a single claim for two
minor accidents in the suspicious period does not occur for the equilibrium audit strategy.
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fraudulent claim can be led, then the late claim is dismissed: another accident occurs and
it is severe with probability bqs, and there is no other accident with probability 1   b. In
both cases, no insurance indemnity is paid for the rst claim.
If the policyholder immediately les a claim after his rst minor accident, then his ex-
pected utility (after this rst accident) is
EuNih = buh(w   Pih   2dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   dih   "):
The policyholder is willling to defraud by making side-payment GSP or GNSP to the car
repairer if EuFih  EuNih, that is if ih  	h(Pih; dih; GSP ; GNSP ), where function 	h(:) is
such that11 	h(Pih; dih; GSP ; GNSP ) < 0 if dih = v = 0, which reects the obvious fact that
no audit is required to dissuade fraud if the defrauders have nothing to earn by postponing
their claims. If dih and/or v are large enough for auditing to be necessary, then we have
	h(Pih; dih; GSP ; GNSP ) 2 (0; 1) and @	h=@GSP ; @	h=@GNSP < 0. We focus on this case
in what follows. The repairer agrees to collude in SP and NSP if his expected gain from
collusion is positive, that is, if GSP   ihB0  0 and GNSP   ihB0  0:The optimal side-
payment o¤er from the policyholder to the car repairer is thus GSP = GNSP = ihB
0. The
policyholder is indi¤erent between defrauding (through an optimal hidden agreement with
the car repairer) and not defrauding if ih = 	h(Pih; dih; ihB
0; ihB0). Let 

h(P; d) 2 (0; 1)
be the (unique) solution of  = 	h(P; d; B0; B0) and let ih = 

h(Pih; dih) 2 (0; 1) with
ih > 	h(Pih; dih; ihB
0; ihB0) i¤ ih > 

h(Pih; dih). We thus have ih = 1 - respect.
ih 2 (0; 1); ih = 0 - if ih < ih - respect. ih = ih; ih > ih. Hence ih is the audit
probability (for claims led for severe accidents) above which type h individuals and repairers
are deterred from colluding, when insurance has been purchased through distribution channel
i.
1.4 Equilibrium fraud and audit
Let L1 and L2 be the expected repair costs, conditionally upon the occurrence of one or two
accidents respectively, with L1 = (qm+2qs)` and L2 = 2(q2m+2q
2
s +3qmqs)`.
12 The expected
11	h(Pih; dih; GSP ; GNSP ) is just the value of ih such that Eu
F
ih = Eu
N
ih.
12 If one single accident occurs, it is minor with probability qm and severe with probability qs, with costs `
and 2`, respectively . In the case of two accidents, both of them are minor with probability q2m and cost 2`, or
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cost of claims may be written as:
Cih = L  (1 + 22)dih + FCih +ACih; (A-2)
where L = 1L1 + 2L2 is the expected repair cost, FCih is the expected cost of fraudulent
claims, and ACih is the expected audit cost. Thus L   (1 + 22)dih is the share of the
expected repair cost borne by the insurer, and FCih + ACih is the total cost of fraud. Let
us express FCih and ACih as functions of fraud and audit strategies. We have:
FCih = qmih(1 + 2)(1  )
fqmb[(1  ih)(dih + v)  2ih(`  dih)]
 (1  qmb)(`  dih)g; (A-3)
which may be read as follows. A policyholder who intends to renew his contract (which
represents a fraction  of all policyholders) may try to defraud if he has at least one accident,
the rst one being minor and in NSP: this case occurs with probability qm(1 + 2)(1  ).
He then postpones his claim with probability ih, and he will actually have the opportunity
to defraud with probability qmb. In that case, fraud will be detected with probability ih,
and no insurance indemnity will be paid for the two minor claims, hence the gain 2(`  dih)
for the insurer. With probability 1 ih, fraud is not detected and the additional cost to the
insurer is dih + v or dih if the fraudulent claim is led in SP or NSP, i.e., with probability 
and 1 , respectively. If the policyholder does not have the opportunity to defraud (which
occurs with probability 1  qmb), he just loses the indemnity for the rst claim `  dih.13
Furthermore, we have ACih = Nihci, where Nih is the number of audits per type h
policyholder for distribution channel i. Audits are concentrated on the rst claims that
correspond to severe accidents. Policyholders have at least one accident, the rst one being
severe, with probability qs(1 + 2). In addition, opportunistic policyholders who intend to
renew their contract le a fraudulent claim with probability q2mih2(1 ).14 Severe accident
claims are audited with probability ih, regardless of when the accidents are reported. Thus,
both are severe with probability q2s and cost 4`, or one is minor and the other one is severe with probability
2qmqs and cost 3`.
13Keep in mind that nes B and B0 are not part of the insurers income.
14 Indeed, the policyholder has two minor accidents, the rst one in NSP with probability q2m2(1  ). He
does not le a claim immediately after the rst accident with probability ih.
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we have:
ACih = Nihci = ihci[qs(1 + 2) + q
2
mih2(1  )]: (A-4)
The audit probability ih is chosen in [0; 1] by the insurer to minimize the expected cost of
claims Cih. We thus have ih = 1 - respect. ih 2 (0; 1); ih = 0 - if ih < ih - respect.
ih = 

ih; ih > 

ih- where 

ih = 
(dih; ci), with
(d; c)  qsc(1 + 2)
2q2m(1  )(2`  d+ v   c)
: (A-5)
ih is the threshold fraud rate such that the insurer is incentivized to audit claims if and
only if ih  ih. We have ih 2 (0; 1) if ci is not too large, and we focus attention on this
case in what follows.
At equilibrium, the decisions of the policyholder-repairer coalition and of the insurer
should be mutual best responses. The equilibrium is in mixed strategies: insurers audit
claims with a probability that makes the potential defrauder (here the policyholder-repairer
coalition) indi¤erent between defrauding and not defrauding, and symmetrically, the fraud
rate makes insurers indi¤erent between auditing and not auditing. This is stated in Propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 1 When insurers o¤er contract (Pi1; di1); (Pi2; di2) through i 2 fD;Ag, the
equilibrium fraud rates and the equilibrium audit strategies are ih = (dih; ci) and ih =
h(Pih; dih), respectively.
Corollary 1 For any distribution channel i 2 fA;Dg, we have i2 > i1 i¤ di2 > di1, i.e.,
the larger the deductible, the larger the fraud rate.
Corollary 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 because (d; c) is increasing in d.
The larger the deductible, the smaller the insurers incentives to audit the claim, and thus the
larger the minimal fraud rate that incentivizes the insurer to perform audits. In particular,
everything else given (and in particular for a given distribution channel), the model predicts
a larger fraud rate for deductible contracts than for full coverage contracts.
When ih = (dih; ci), the expected cost of an insurance policy purchased by type h
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individuals through channel i is
Cih = L  (1 + 22)dih + k0(dih + k1)(dih; ci);
where k0 = qm(1 + 2)(1  ) 2 (0; 1) and k1 = qmbv + `(1  qmb). Insurers price their
contracts with the loading factor  > 0. Thus, we have:
Pih = (1 + )Cih
= (1 + )[L  (1 + 22)dih + k0(dih + k1)(dih; ci)];
which may be written more compactly as Pih = (dih; (di1h; ci));where
(d; )  (1 + )[L  (1 + 22)d+ k0(d+ k1)]:
It is assumed that competition betwen insurers allows policyholders to extract all the surplus
of the insurance contract. This surplus is independent from the individuals preferences
between the two distribution channels, i.e., from the search costs tx and t(1   x) when
the insurance seekers choose to purchase insurance from D or A, respectively. Thus, the
equilibrium contract (Pih; dih) maximizes uh(P; d) subject to P = (d; (d; ci)), and the
equilibrium fraud rates are ih = (dih; ci) for h 2 f1; 2g,i 2 fA;Dg.
Proposition 2 The optimal insurance contracts are such that di2  di1  0, with di2 > di1
if di1 > 0 for i = A or D.
The extent of coverage is the result of a trade-o¤ between the incentives to audit claims
and the transaction costs, materialized by the fact that the fraud rate (d; c) is increasing
in d and by the loading factor , respectively. In the absence of transaction costs, overcov-
erage would be optimal.15 We have excluded overcoverage so that full coverage would be
optimal if there were no transaction costs. However, transaction costs reduce the optimal
insurance coverage. Type 1 individuals are more risk averse than type 2 individuals, and
thus Proposition 2 states that their deductible is smaller, as in the usual comparative stat-
ics of deductible contracts (see Schlesinger (2013)). The trade-o¤ between increasing audit
incentives and reducing transaction costs may tip in favor of positive deductibles for type
15See Boyer (2004).
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2 and full coverage for type 1, and in that case deductible and no-deductible contracts are
simultaneously o¤ered at equilibrium.16
Proposition 3 At equilibrium, we have D1 > A1; D2 > A2; that is, for both types
of individuals the fraud rate is larger among insurance policies purchased through D than
through A.
Insurers need additional incentives to audit claims when insurance policies have been
purchased through D than through A, because establishing the truth is more costly in the
rst case than in the second (i.e., cD > cA). These additional incentives emerge when the
fraud rate is higher, which corresponds to the fact that (d; c) is increasing with c, hence
at equilibrium there is a higher fraud rate for D than for A. The proof of Proposition 3
shows that this basic intuition remains valid if we take into account the fact that optimal
deductibles may di¤er between both cases (i.e., we may have dDh 6= dAh), which also a¤ect
incentives.
Finally, the market shares of D and A are dened by the threshold xh 2 [0; 1] such that
type h individuals located at x 2 [0; 1] choose i = D if x < xh, and they choose i = A if
x > xh. We have Pih = (dih; ih) for i 2 fD;Ag. Hence
uh((dDh; Dh); dDh)  txh = uh((dAh; Ah); dAh)  t(1  xh);
and thus the market shares of D and A are characterized by
xh =
1
2
+
uh((dDh; Dh); dDh)  uh((dAh; Ah); dAh)
2t
;
for h = 1; 2.
1.5 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
If ih > 

ih, then the optimal choice of the policyholder is ih = 0 < 

ih, which gives
ih = 0 for the optimal choice of the insurer, hence a contradiction. Symmetrically, if
16See the illustrative example with mean-variance preferences below.
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ih < 

ih, then the optimal choice of the policyholder is ih = 1 > 

ih, which gives ih = 1
for the optimal choice of the insurer, hence once again a contradiction. Thus we necessarily
have ih = 

ih 2 (0; 1) at equilibrium. ih = ih is an optimal choice of the insurer if
ih = 

ih. Symmetrically, ih = 

ih 2 (0; 1) is an optimal choice of the policyholder if
ih = 

ih. Thus ih = 

ih; ih = 

ih is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let the expected utility of type h = 1; 2 policyholders who purchase insurance through
i = A;D be written as euih(d)  uh((d; (d; ci)); d); where (:) and (:) are dened by
(d; ) = (1 + )[L  (1 + 22)d+ k0(d+ k1)];
(d; c) = Kc(2`  d+ v   c) 1;
with K  qs(1 + 2)=2q2m(1  ). Let ei(d)  (d; (d; ci)). We have
e0i(d) = (1 + ) (1 + 22) + k0(d; ci) + k0Kc(d+ k1)(2`  d+ v   ci)2

e00i (d) = 2Kck0(1 + )(2`  d+ v   ci) 3(2`+ v   ci + k1) > 0:
Thus, we have
euih(d) = (1  1   2)uh(w   ei(d)) + 1uh(w   ei(d)  d  ")
+2uh(w   ei(d)  2d  2");
eu0ih(d) =  (1  1   2)u0h(w   ei(d))e0i(d)
 1u0h(w   ei(d)  d  ")[1 + e0i(d)]
 2u0h(w   ei(d)  2d  2")[2 + e0i(d)]:
Using e00i (d) > 0 and u00h < 0 shows that euih(d) is a concave function. Let dih be the optimal
deductible for type h individuals, i.e., dih maximizes euih(d) with respect to d  0. Assume
rst that di2 > 0, which implies eu0i2(di2) = 0 and e0i(di2) < 0 . We have
eu0i1(di2) =  (1  1   2)u01(w   ei(di2))e0i(di2)
 1u01(w   ei(di2)  di2   ")[1 + e0i(di2)]
 2u01(w   ei(di2)  2di2   2")[2 + e0i(di2)]:
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Since type 1 individuals are more risk averse than type 2 individuals, we know from Pratt
(1964) that there exists a function g : R  ! R such that u1(y)  g(u2(y)), with g0 > 0 and
g00 < 0. This allows us to write
eu0i1(di2) =  (1  1   2)g0(u2(y0))u02(y0)e0i(di2)
 1g0(u2(y1))u02(y1)(1 + e0i(di2))
 2g0(u2(y2))u01(y2)(2 + e0i(di2));
where y0 = w   ei(di2); y1 = w   ei(di2)   di2   " and y2 = w   ei(di2)   2di2   2", with
y2 < y1 < y0. Let us rst consider the case where 1 + e0i(di2) > 0. Let y 2 (y1; y0). Using
g00 < 0 and u02 > 0 yields
g0(u2(y0)) < g0(u2(y)) < g0(u2(y1)) < g0(u2(y2)):
Using e0i(di2) < 0 < 1 + e0i(di2) then gives
eu0i1(di2) < g0(u2(y))eu0i2(di2) = 0;
which implies di1 < di2 because of the concavity of eui1(d). Similarly, when 1 + e0i(di2) < 0 <
2 + e0i(di2), we let y 2 (y2; y1) and a similar argument also yields di1 < di2. Similarly, if
di2 = 0, we have eu0i1(0)  0, and the same argument gives eu0i2(0) < 0 and thus di1 = 0.
Example with mean-variance preferences
The case di1 = 0; di2 > 0 can be conveniently illustrated by a mean-variance example.
Assume that u1(wf ) and u2(wf ) are quadratic, so that we may write
uh(wf ) = E(wf )  hV ar(wf );
with 1 > 2. When insurance is purchased through distribution channel i, we have
E(wf ) = w   ei(d)  (1 + 22)(d+ ");
V ar(wf ) = I(d+ ")
2;
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with I = 1(1  1) + 42(1  1   2) > 0. We have dih > 0 i¤
 e0i(0)  (1 + 22)  2hI"2 > 0;
and thus we have di1 = 0; di2 > 0 if 2 < 

i < 1, where
i =
1
2I"2


(1 + 22)  k0Kci(1 + )(2`+ v   ci + k1)
(2`+ v   ci)2

Proof of Proposition 3
Let us write:
uh((d; ); d)   h(d; );
(d; c) = Kc(2`  d+ v   c) 1;
with K  qs(1 + 2)=2q2m(1   ). Assume uh((d; (d; c)); d) =  h(d; (d; c)) is
maximized w.r.t. d at d = bdh(c) with fraud rate bh(c)  (bdh(c); c). Thus, we have
ih = bh(ci)  (bdh(ci); ci) for i 2 fA;Dg. The rst-order and second-order optimality
conditions for this maximization are respectively written as:
Fh   0hd +  0h
@
@d
= 0; (A-6)
Sh   00hd2 +  00hd
@
@d
+  00h2

@
@d
2
+  0h
@2
@d2
< 0; (A-7)
where  0hd; 
0
h; 
00
hd2 ; 
00
hd; 
00
h2 denote rst and second derivatives of  h and all functions
are evaluted at d = bdh(c). Di¤erentiating (A-6) gives bd0h(c) =  F 0hc=Sh where:
F 0hc =
@Fh
@c
=  00hd
@
@c
+  00h2
@
@c
@
@d
+  0h
@2
@d@c
:
After simplication we get:
b0h(c) = @@d bd0h(c) + @@c
= (1=Sh)

 0h

@2
@d2
@
@c
  @
2
@d@c
@
@d

+  00hd2
@
@c

; (A-8)
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with
@2
@d2
@
@c
  @
2
@d@c
@
@d
= K2c(2`  d  c) 4 > 0;
and
 h(d; ) = (1  1   2)uh(w   (d; ))
+1uh(w   (d; )  d) + 2uh(w   (d; )  2d):
(d; ) is linear in d, and thus  h(d; ) is concave in d, which implies  00hd2 < 0. We also
have  0h = (@uh=@P ) (@=@) < 0. Using (A-8) and  0h < 0; 00hd2 < 0; @=@c > 0 then
yields b0h(c) > 0. Thus, we have Dh = bh(cD) > bh(cA) = A1h.
1.6 Fraud and bargaining power
We may adapt the previous model in order to show how the bargaining power of the
policyholder-repairer coalition a¤ects the scale of fraud. As in Section 3 of the paper, the
bargaining power of the colluders is taken into account by assuming that the defrauders will
not be punished with probability i 2 (0; 1), with i = D or A. Intuitively, the insurance
agent is incentivized to stand up for its customer (and possibly also for the repairer in the
case of a DOA that owns the repair shop), and it may threaten the insurer to redirect its
customers toward another insurer. This may deter the insurer from enforcing the penalty.
A larger bargaining power for D than for A corresponds to D > A. Thus, if the colluders
are spotted (which occurs if the claim is audited), then with probability 1  i the penalties
are enforced (no indemnity is paid by the insurer and the colluders pay the nes B and B0,
respectively), and with probability i the insurer interprets the fraud as an involuntary error,
i.e., the policyholder receives the total cumulated contractual indemnity 2(`   dih) and no
nes are paid. Under these assumptions, a type h policyholder with two minor accidents
and a repairer are willing to defraud (with the policyholder making a side-payment G to the
repairer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis) if
EuFih  EuNih; (A-9)
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and
G  ih(1  i)B0  0; (A-10)
respectively, with
EuFih = qmb[(1  ih)uh(w   Pih   dih   2"+ v  G)
+ih(1  i)uh(w   Pih   2`  2" G B) + ihiuh(w   Pih   2dih  G)]
+(1  qmb)[buh(w   Pih   `  dih   2") + (1  b)uh(w   Pih   `  ")]:
Fraud is deterred (i.e., ih = 0) if ih > 

ih where 

ih(Pi1; dih; i) is the value of ih
such that
EuFih = Eu
N
ih with G = ih(1  i)B0:
Since defrauders who are caught are not punished with probability i, the expected
actuarial cost of a deductible insurance policy is now written as
FCih = qmih(1 + 2)(1  )
fqmb[(1  ih)(dih + v)  2ih(1  i)(`  dih)]
 (1  qmb)(`  dih)g: (A-11)
The equilibrium audit and fraud strategies are ih = (dih; ci; i) and ih = 

ih(Pih; dih; i),
with
ih(dih; ci; i) 
qsci(1 + 2)
2q2m(1  )[(1  i)(2`  dih) + id+ v   ci)
; (A-12)
which can be interpreted in the same way as (A-5). The equilibrium contract (Pih; dih)
maximizes uh(P; d) subject to P = (d; (d; ci; i)), and the equilibrium fraud rates are
ih = 
(dih; ci; i) for i = A or D. In the same way as in the proof of Proposition 3, we
can then show that Dh > Ah if cD = cA and D > A. To establish this result, we make
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the additional assumption D < 1=2.
17 The denition of (d; ) is unchanged, and we still
denote  h(d; )  uh((d; ); d).
 h(d; 
(d; c; )) is maximized w.r.t. d at d = edh(c; ), with fraud rate eh(c; ) 
(edh(c; ); c; ). The equilibrium fraud rates are ih = eh(ci; i)  (edh(ci; i); ci; i)
for i 2 fA;Dg. We have (similarly to the proof of Proposition 3, with an unchanged deni-
tion for Sh):
@e(c; )
@
=
@
@d
@ edh(c; )
@
+
@
@
= (1=Sh)

 0h

@2
@d2
@
@
  @
2
@d@
@
@d

+  00hd2
@
@

: (A-13)
We have (d; c; ) = Kc[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 1, and thus
@
@d
= Kc(1  2)[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 2;
@
@
= 2Kc(`  d)[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 2;
@2
@d2
=  2Kc(1  2)2[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 3;
@2
@d@
=  2Kc[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 2
  4Kc(1  2)(`  d)[(1  )(2`  d) + d+ v   c] 3:
Hence,
@2
@d2
@
@
  @
2
@d@
@
@d
= 2K2c2(1  2)[(1  )(2`  d) + d  c] 4 > 0:
Using Sh < 0; 0h < 0; 
00
hd2 < 0; @
=@ > 0; (A-13) yields @e(c; )=@ > 0. Thus, we have
Dh = e(c; D) > e(c; A) = A1 when cD = cA = c and D > A.
2 Complements to the empirical analysis
17For a given fraud rate ih, the decrease in actuarial cost dCih < 0 induced by a small increase in the
audit probability dih > 0 is dCih =  q2mih[dih + 2(1  i)(`  dih)]dih. We consider the case where the
decrease in cost is larger when the deductible is lower, which requires i < 1=2.
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2.1 Validating the IV approach
Table 8 provides three tests that conrm the properness of our IV approach. In the two rst
stage of LPMs, the Anderson-Rubin test and the J test do not reject the null hypothesis of
the exogenous instrumental variable and the null hypothesis of no over identied instruments.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. We also nd
the consistent results obtained in the 2SLS approach that policyholders living in areas with
high average income or low percentage of highly educated people signicantly tend to choose
policies with deductibles and not to renew their contract.
2.2 Testing Hypothesis 1 through the Chiappori-Salanié (2000) approach
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) use a pair of Probit regressions to explain the probability
of ling a claim and the probability of choosing partial coverage, and they appraise the
conditional dependence between these two variables by submitting the residuals of the two
regressions to a W test. Similarly, we have run two sets of pairwise Probit regressions,
respectively with SG1 and SC, and with SG2 and SC as dependent variables. The W
statistics, calculated with the residuals of each pairwise regressions, are signicantly di¤erent
from 0 at the 1% threshold. In each case, we have also calculated the correlation coe¢ cient
of these residuals: both are positive and signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level, which
conrms the validity of Hypothesis 1.18
2.3 Additional test for Hypothesis 2
The regression that explains the value of the claims has also been performed over the whole
sample (not only the SG group) by including dummies SG1i; SG2i; SCi; firsti; and their
double and triple interaction terms in the explanatory variables. Furthermore, in order to
be able to identify fraud (as dened above, that is claims manipulation) and the premium
recouping behavior, we also include RGi, and the double and triple interaction variables
18Computing the W statistic with the residuals of the regressions for SG1 and SC yields W = 201:76,
which is signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. The correlation coe¢ cient between the residuals of
these regressions is  = 0:003611, and it is also signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. Likewise, using
the residuals from the regressions for SG2 and SC gives W = 257:99 and  = 0:03221, and these statistics
are signicantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level. The full regression results are available from the authors
upon request.
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RGi  SCi, and RGi  SCi  firsti among explanatory variables.
clmamti = s1SG1i + s2SG2i + RGRGi + cSCi + ffirsti
+cfSCi  firsti + sf1SG1i  firsti + sf2SG2i  firsti
+RfRGi  firsti + sc1SG1i  SCi + sc2SG2i  SCi
+RcRGi  SCi + scf1SG1i  SCi  firsti
+scf2SG2i  SCi  firsti + RcfRGi  SCi  firsti + Xi:
(A-6)
Performing this regression among the 69,082 claims led by the members of the research
sample gives bscf1 = 96:7 with p value <0.012, bscf2 = 235:1 with p value <0.0001, andbRcf =  97:3 with p value <0.086.19 The inequalities bscf2 > bscf1 > 0 once again validate
Hypothesis 2. Symmetrically, bRcf < 0 conrms that members of the RG group tend to le
small claims at the end of the policy year, when they have not led any claim during the
previous months.
2.4 Taking adverse selection into account
In a setting with adverse selection, past and future claim experiences may be linked, but
man-made claim manipulation should reduce the predictive power of this link. To check
if this is actually the case, we have used the 2010 data to run two Probit regressions that
estimate the probability of ling a claim either in any month of 2011 or in the suspicious
period of 2011, respectively. The regressions were run separately for the suspicious and non-
suspicious groups.20 Observing the policyholders2011 claim records allows us to calculate
the prediction error for the claims led in all of 2011 and for the claims led in the suspicious
period of 2011. In a second stage, we use a t-test to evaluate whether this prediction error is
smaller for the claims led over the whole year than for those led in the suspicious period.21
Panel A of Table 5 conrms that this is the case, at the same time for both the suspicious
19The full estimated results of regressions (11) and (A-6) are available from the authors upon request.
20 In other words, these Probit regressions regress clmi and SCi, respectively, on the explanatory variables
included in the vector of observable variables Xi.
21The prediction error is the absolute value of the di¤erence between the estimated probability of ling a
claim and the dummy equal to 1 if the individual has led a claim in 2011 and 0 otherwise. We calculate the
di¤erence between the prediction errors over the whole 2011 year and over the suspicious period, and we test
whether this di¤erence is negative.
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and non-suspicious groups. Furthermore, the di¤erence of the prediction error is signicantly
di¤erent and larger in absolute value in the suspicious groups, especially in SG2, than in the
non-suspicious group. This conrms the manipulation of claims, beyond any possible hidden
information about policyholdersrisk types.
Secondly, we know that adverse selection may lead to a positive correlation between the
contract coverage and the probability of ling claims, but it does not induce any particular
timing for claims such as the one on which we are focusing. Panel B of Table 5 provides
the hazard rate in the suspicious groups SG1 and SG2, and in the non-suspicious group.
In SG1 and SG2, the hazard rates are signicantly higher in the last policy month than
in the other months, and these last month hazard rates are signicantly higher than in the
non-suspicious group, which conrms that claim manipulation does occur. The fact that the
last month hazard rate is even larger for SG2 than for SG1 conrms that our observations
cannot be attributed to adverse selection.
2.5 Testing Hypothesis 1 for type B contracts only
Table 6 reports the results of two-stage regressions by limiting our sample to type B con-
tracts.22 The results are consistent with those of Table 3, which conrms the validity of
Hypothesis 1.
2.6 Additional test for Hypothesis 3
It is legitimate to ask whether the higher expected cost of claims in the DOA channel simply
reects the fact that, on average, the individuals who take out insurance from DOAs have
higher risks, rather than fraudulent behaviors. This issue may be claried by estimating the
claim amount using the following OLS regression:
claimamti = 0 + DDi + AAi + BBi + DADi Ai + DBDi Bi + Xi + "i:
claimamti is the claim amount which is estimated in thousand US dollars. Ai and Bi
are dummies for type A or B contracts, respectively, with type C contract as counterpart,
22 In other words, in this test, the suspicious group includes the policyholders (from the SG1 group) with
a no-deductible type B contract that has been renewed at the end of the policy year, and the policyholders
(from the SG2 group) with a deductible type B contract that has been renewed at the end of the policy year,
while the control group contains the other policyholders with a type B contract that has not been renewed.
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and Xi includes the underwriting and pricing variables as in the previous regressions. The
estimated results are in Table 7. Type A and B contracts are associated with claim costs
that are signicantly larger than for type C contracts. The estimated coe¢ cient of Di is
negative, but it is not signicantly di¤erent from 0. Likewise, the estimated coe¢ cients of
interaction terms Di Ai, and Di Bi are not signicantly di¤erent from 0. In other words,
the policyholders of the DOA channel do not have higher claim costs than others, whatever
their contract. In other words, the increase in claim costs is not an intrinsic characteristic
of the distribution channel: it reects the fraudulent behaviors of some policyholders (the
suspicious groups) who may take advantage of the manipulation of claims, and this behavior
is facilitated by DOAs.
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 Table 5: Additional evidence of fraud  
 SG1 SG2 non-SG 
 Panel A: Predicted errors 
filing a claim 0.1127 0.1999 0.0832 
filing SC 0.4328 0.5493 0.2605 
t test -138.3376(<0.0001) -200 (<0.0001) -36.6563(<0.0001) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Baseline hazard in each policy month 
1st month 0.0220 0.0253 0.0749 
2nd month 0.0132 0.0157 0.0655 
3rd month 0.0184 0.0158 0.0661 
4th month 0.0126 0.0140 0.0638 
5th month 0.0128 0.0154 0.0651 
6th month 0.0136 0.0148 0.0647 
7th month 0.0117 0.0148 0.0645 
8th month 0.0151 0.0127 0.0630 
9th month 0.0179 0.0129 0.0634 
10th month 0.0200 0.0198 0.0699 
11th month 0.0613 0.2210 0.1240 
12th month 0.5401 0.6212 0.2633 
 
Table 6: Empirical evidence of fraud - Focus on type B contracts  
 
 First stage (bivariate Probit) Second stage 
 SG deduct 2SLS-Probit DGV-Probit 
constant 7.2958*** -1.7120*** -2.2382*** -2.1955*** 
Pr(SG1)   0.3556** 0.2596* 
Pr(SG2)   0.4711*** 0.3820** 
SG1    1.0101*** 
SG2    1.0960*** 
income  -6.86E-06** 2.54E-05***    
edu 0.5871* -1.7021**   
RG -7.1345*** 0.2422*** 0.2747*** 0.2155*** 
female 0.0118 -0.1863*** 0.0071  0.0088 
age2530 -0.4080** 0.1530  0.2421  0.2353  
age3060 -0.3893** -0.0214  0.2656  0.2602  
ageabv60 -0.5109*** -0.0157  0.1796  0.1701  
carage0 -0.5388*** -0.2287*** 0.9048*** 0.8933*** 
carage1 -0.1891*** -0.1593*** 0.0917** 0.0875** 
carage2 -0.1181** -0.0785* 0.0167  0.0142  
carage3 -0.0239  -0.0780* -0.0226  -0.0232  
carage4 -0.0552  -0.0556  -0.0226  -0.0230  
veh_m 0.0155 0.0548* -0.0559** -0.0584** 
veh_l 0.0911*** 0.1027*** -0.1678*** -0.1721*** 
sedan 0.1076** 0.1369*** -0.0970** -0.0983** 
logprem 0.0707*** -0.2086*** 0.1929*** 0.2060*** 
bonus -0.1377*** 0.2890*** -0.5338*** -0.5580*** 
Pseudo  0.1095 0.1062 0.4872 
 
Same notes as in Table 3
Table 7: Comparing the risk between the policyholders from DOA and other 
distribution channels 
 
Variables  Est. Ceoff. P value 
Intercept -3.5765 <0.0001 
D 0.0033 0.9200 
A 0.3276 0.0020 
B 0.5847 <0.0001 
D*A 0.0513 0.1344 
D*B 0.0580 0.1330 
female -0.0371 0.0370 
age2530 0.1056 0.3930 
age3060 -0.1425 0.2330 
ageabv60 -0.1401 0.2530 
carage0 0.1911 0.0000 
carage1 0.0963 0.0010 
carage2 0.0658 0.0380 
carage3 0.0761 0.0150 
carage4 0.0487 0.1550 
veh_m -0.0122 0.5430 
veh_l 0.1944 <0.0001 
sedan 0.2318 <0.0001 
logprem 0.5236 <0.0001 
bonus 0.4209 <0.0001 
 
Note 
In the above regression, we have also controlled the brand of the car. The results are not reported for 
confidentiality reasons. 
 
 Table 8: Empirical results from 2SLS-LPM 
 2SLS-LPM 
 SG SC deduct SC 
constant -3.0085*** -5.7209*** -0.3407 -4.6759*** 
Pr(SG)  0.3670***   
Pr(deduct)    0.2223*** 
income  -3.57E-06***  8.93E-06***  
edu 0.0839*  -0.3051**  
RG -0.4447*** 0.2212* 0.0297*** 0.3838*** 
female 0.1222*** 0.1185 -0.0051** 0.0710*** 
age2530 0.2590 0.5613***  0.0386 0.4713*** 
age3060 0.3809 0.6942*** 0.0335 0.5551*** 
ageabv60 0.2970 0.5418** 0.0338 0.4324*** 
carage0 0.1501*** 0.7874*** 0.0446***  0.8329*** 
carage1 0.0789*** 0.0062 0.0265*** 0.0302  
carage2 0.0591* -0.0214  0.0161*** -0.0029  
carage3 0.0280* -0.0272  0.0072** -0.0188  
carage4 0.0204  -0.0263  0.0057  -0.0196  
veh_m 0.1394  -0.1786** 0.0011 -0.1298*** 
veh_l 0.2793*** -0.4421*** 0.0134*** -0.3394*** 
sedan 0.1395*** -0.2386*** 0.0053  -0.1861*** 
logprem 0.5736*** 0.8029** 0.0522** 0.5818*** 
bonus -0.7123*** -1.2937*** -0.0490*** -1.0154*** 
 
J test 
p-value 
0.5665 
 p-value 
0.5406 
 
Anderson-Rubin test 0.6981  0.7055  
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 0.0576  0.0279  
 
 
